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A

SECOND LETTER

TO THE

HON. THOMAS ERSKINE.

[Price Two Shillings.]

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CONTAINING

FARTHER STRICTURES on his "VIEW of the CAUSES and CONSEQUENCES of the WAR:"

Some REFLECTIONS on the Subject of the PRESENT NEGOTIATION; and OBSERVATIONS on the late VOLUNTARY LOAN.

With a WORD to the CRITICS, ſubjoined,

By JOHN GIFFORD, Esq.
Author of "A Letter to the Earl of LAUDERDALE,"
&c. &c.

Fermez lo'reille aux faux rapports; ils peuvent nuire ſi on les ecoute, mais lorſqu'on les mépriſe et les rejette, ils ne font que tourner à la confuſion de celui qui s'en promettoit quelque ſuccès.

Le Comte de SCHULENBOURG.

LONDON:

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1797.

A

SECOND LETTER

TO

THE HON. THOMAS ERSKINE.

SIR,

A STRONG conviction of the neceſſity of immediately counteracting the impreſſion which your Pamphlet was calculated to produce, not merely on the ſuperficial and uninformed claſs of ſociety, but on certain minds of a ſuperior caſt, which, building their credit of your political aſſertions on the reſpectability of your private character, were liable to be miſled with regard to important facts, which they wanted either the means or the inclination to verify, induced me to commit my Firſt Letter to the preſs, with a degree of expedition that precluded the poſſibility of pointing out *all* your errors, and expoſing *all* your miſrepreſentations. Unwilling, however, on the ſubject of a conteſt, a right underſtanding of which is ſo eſſential to the preſent and future tranquillity of the country, that any erroneous ſtatements ſhould, under the ſanction of your name, acquire the force and authority of truth, I avail myſelf of the firſt

moment of leiſure to ſupply ſuch omiſſions, and to urge, as briefly as may be, ſome farther objections to particular paſſages, which ſeem, in a peculiar manner, to require elucidation. In doing this, I ſhall not ſeek to preſerve a connected chain of argument, but content myſelf with noticing the different points in the ſame order in which they appear.

You affirm, that "America and France began "their revolutions *upon the ſame principles*;" and that "both governments might have continued "monarchical, if corrupt power would have ſub-"mitted to correction[1]." An attentive peruſal of the French Declaration of the Rights of Men, and the American Declaration of Independence, will ſuffice to demonſtrate the inaccuracy of the firſt part of your affirmation, by proving the two revolutions to have ſprung from different motives, and to have been founded on *oppoſite* principles[2]. That corruptions and abuſes exiſted in the ancient Government of France, I will readily admit; and few perſons, I believe, were better acquainted than myſelf with their nature and extent. But ſo far from any averſion from the correction of ſuch abuſes having been diſplayed by the laſt virtuous Monarch who filled the throne, the moſt earneſt deſire and the fulleſt intention to promote their extirpation were manifeſted by him, from the period of his acceſſion to the day of his murder. "*My greateſt deſire is to render my people happy,*"

[1] Page 6.

[2] *Retention* was the principle of the one: *Deſtruction* that of the other.

was

was the firſt ſentence uttered by him in the firſt Council in which he preſided as Sovereign[3]; and his whole reign diſplayed the ſincerity of his mind, and his fixed determination to reduce to practice the principles which he invariably profeſſed[4]. Had the majority of his ſubjects poſſeſſed a hundredth part of thoſe virtuous feelings which glowed in the boſom of their Prince, France had ſtill been a Monarchy; for the Government periſhed, not by its own corruption, but by the corruption of its enemies,—by their diſregard of every moral and political principle,—by their utter contempt of every religious and ſocial tie.

There is no one circumſtance in political controverſy more favourable to the purpoſes of miſrepreſentation, than a ſtudied neglect in the verification of dates. By the inſidious omiſſion to ſtate preciſe periods, facts, which cannot otherwiſe be approximated, are eaſily brought into conjunction; and the triumph of fraud is too often rendered complete by the credulity of indolence. Adverting to the ſeditious publications of the democratic ſocieties in this kingdom, you ſeek to afford them an indirect juſtification, by imputing them to a "juſt indignation towards the confedracies then "forming in Europe:" whereas the fact is, that the publications in queſtion *preceded* the birth of

[3] See "Eloge hiſtorique & funebre de Louis XVI." par M. MONTJOIE, p. 131.

[4] If you will take the trouble to compare any of the Revolutionary conſtitutions with the plan of reform preſented by the King to the States General on the 23d of June 1789, you will find that he offered his ſubjects a much greater portion of rational freedom than they have ſince received from their repreſentatives.

the confederacies, none of which were forming at that time. The Emperor's letter from Padua, of the 27th of July 1791, is the *firſt* ſtep which excited the cenſure of the French, as it appears from the decree paſſed againſt him by the National Aſſembly in the month of January 1792. And in *April* 1791, the REVOLUTION SOCIETY in London ſent an addreſs to the Jacobin Club at Paris, containing the following expreſſions: "*Royal pre-* "*rogatives injurious to the public intereſt, a ſervile* "*Peerage, a rapacious and intolerant Clergy, and* "*a corrupt Repreſentation*, are grievances under "which WE labour. But as YOU, perhaps, have "profited from the example of our anceſtors, ſo "ſhall we from YOUR late glorious and ſplendid "actions[5]." Now, Sir, if in theſe two circumſtances the confederacies for the preſervation of exiſting inſtitutions, on the one hand, and the aſſociations for the purpoſe of ſubverting them, on the other, you really deſcry cauſe and effect, you muſt certainly admit, that the aſſociations produced the confederacies, ſince cauſe muſt precede effect.

In the ſame ſpirit of *accuracy*, you mention the conſequences reſulting from Mr. BURKE's celebrated Reflections on the French Revolution as one of the circumſtances which gave riſe to the King's Proclamation, although Mr. BURKE's publication appeared in November 1790, and the Proclamation was not iſſued till the 21ſt of May 1792. In order, however, to magnify the conſe-

[5] Correſpondence of the Revolution Society, p. 86.

quence

quence of your Party, and to excite an odium againſt the Government, you ſtate the immediate cauſe of that Proclamation to have been the notice given by Mr. GREY, in the Houſe of Commons, of his intention to move for a Parliamentary Reform. Here again you are guilty of a miſrepreſentation, which a ſmall degree of attention to facts would have taught you to avoid. It was *in the beginning of May, that the Jacobin Correſpondence of the Revolution Society*, quoted above, *was firſt publiſhed in the form of a regular volume*; and PAINE's Second Part of the Rights of Man, *combining* PRACTICE *with Principle*, appeared about the ſame time, and was induſtriouſly circulated by the factious clubs in this kingdom. Theſe were the real grounds of the Proclamation; and the Jacobin Correſpondence was pretty diſtinctly alluded to in the paper itſelf.

Your artful approximation of remote facts, and your ſtudious omiſſion of intervening circumſtances, are remarkable in the following paſſage of your book: "The Proclamation was planted as "the only genuine banner of loyalty; voluntary "bodies, to ſtrengthen the executive power, by "maintaining proſecutions, were every where in-"ſtituted; ſociety was rent aſunder, and the har-"mony and freedom of Engliſh manners were, for "a ſeaſon, totally deſtroyed. It was AT THIS "PERIOD that the ſeeds of war were ſown[6]." We have ſeen that the Proclamation was iſſued on the 21ſt of May; and the loyal aſſociations, it is

[6] P. 17.

well known, were not eſtabliſhed till November following; and, in the interval, the diſaffected ſocieties had ſent emiſſaries and ambaſſadors to France, to congratulate the rebels on the abolition of Monarchy, and to expreſs a hope that their example might be generally followed throughout Europe. If by "THIS PERIOD" you mean the period of the eſtabliſhment of the loyal aſſociations, you are ſo far correct; the ſeeds of war were then ſown; but not becauſe meaſures of precaution had been adopted in England, but becauſe the National Aſſembly had previouſly paſſed the decree of fraternization on the 19th of November, and had taken thoſe other ſteps noticed in my former Letter, which actually led to the commencement of hoſtilities.

You are ſingularly unfortunate in your ſelection of authorities for the ſupport of your favourite poſitions. Alluding to the reforming ſpirit of the age, in your opinion "*virtuous* and *laudable*," you obſerve[7], "This ſpirit is at preſent high in Ireland; "and the recent zeal of that brave and virtuous "people has completely detected the *falſe and* "*malicious calumnies upon both countries*. It has "demonſtrated, that *a deſire to reform abuſes* in the "Government is not at all connected with *diſ-* "*loyalty to its eſtabliſhment*, and that the reſtora- "tion of a free conſtitution, by the wiſdom and "ſpirit of a nation, *has no alliance with, but, on* "*the contrary, is utterly abhorrent to a ſubmiſſion* "*to a foreign force*." That there were thouſands

[7] P. 21.

of

of brave and virtuous men in Ireland, no man in his ſenſes ever preſumed to doubt; and that *ſuch men* would fly to the defence of their country, whenever it ſhould be threatened by a foreign foe, every man was convinced. But what has this to do with the ſpirit of reform, or with the conduct of the reformers? We all know, that the great Reformers and the United Iriſhmen at Belfaſt were the only men who refuſed, when called upon, to ſecond the general zeal, and take up arms againſt the invaders of the country. And the public will now know, (for a complete Hiſtory of the Iriſh Plot, its origin, its progreſs, its connection, and its object, is, I underſtand, in the preſs[8],) that what you repreſent as a *deſire to reform abuſes* wholly unconnected with *diſloyalty*, was nothing leſs than a conſpiracy for ſubverting the Government and Conſtitution of the Country, for involving in one general maſſacre all thoſe who poſſeſſed power or property in the Iſland, and for introducing the accurſed code of French anarchy, under the influence and with the aſſiſtance of the French Directory, with whom a regular correſpondence had been long maintained. This, Sir, will be proved by documents, the authenticity of which even the virulent tongue of faction will not dare to impeach. Such is the *reform* which your Hibernian Patriots, in con-

[8] Since the above was written, the tract in queſtion has been publiſhed under the title of "AN ADDRESS to the NATION, "ſhewing the neceſſity of forming an armed Aſſociation in "conſequence of the CONSPIRACY of the REPUBLICANS in "IRELAND to SUBVERT the CONSTITUTION."

junction with a ſet of miſcreants in England, and in imitation of ROBERSPIERRE, wiſhed to promote in the ſiſter kingdom.

You remark[9], that the decree of the 19th of November, the nature and tendency of which I ſo amply diſcuſſed in my former Letter, " and " the ſyſtem of which it was a part, *exiſted only* " *upon paper*, and in the inflammatory ſpeeches of " enthuſiaſtic men, *until confederated Europe be-* " *gan the actual and forcible fraternization of the* " *monarchical part of France.*" Here you are again wrong, in point of time, on the other ſide; for the decree was paſſed *after* the Emigrants under the French Princes had appeared in conjunction with the Allied Armies under the Duke of Brunſwick. Nor is it true, that it was ever ſuffered to remain a dead letter upon the revolutionary ſtatute-book. It was framed with an expreſs view to a particular caſe[10]; it was followed up, in leſs than a month, by a ſecond decree, ſtill, if poſſible, more pernicious; and was acted upon in the Netherlands, and wherever an opportunity offered, without the ſmalleſt delay.

Flying back, with forenſic dexterity, from the French Decree to the Britiſh Proclamation, from November to May, you accuſe the Miniſters of having *covertly libelled France* in that paper. But you muſt have been ſenſible that ſuch an accuſation could only be ſupported by the law principle, ſo often fooliſhly miſinterpreted and miſrepreſented,

[9] P. 25.

[10] The ſeizure of the Duchy of Deux-Ponts.

and

and ſometimes for factious purpoſes, that *truth is a libel.* The Proclamation merely ſtated, that "there was reaſon to believe that correſpondencies "had been entered into with ſundry perſons in "foreign parts, with a view to forward the crimi-"nal and wicked purpoſes beforementioned" in the Proclamation. The Revolution Society, as I have before remarked, had juſt avowed their correſpondence, with which the National Aſſembly were acquainted, and of which they had ſignified their approbation. By a reference to p. 41 of this Correſpondence, you may ſee the reſolutions of that Society, dated July 20th, 1790, and tranſmitted by Lord STANHOPE, their Preſident, to the National Aſſembly of France. One of the reſolutions is couched in theſe terms, "*That this Meet-*"*ing do conſider the correſpondence which has been* "*maintained by the Committee, in the name of the* "*Society, with the Patriots of France, as highly* "*honourable to this Society, and to the national* "*character; and they truſt it will produce the* "*happieſt effects* in continuing the friendſhip that "ſubſiſts between the two Countries, and *in* "*animating the Sons of Freedom to aſſert their* "*rights among all the nations of the earth.*" The anſwer, ſigned TREILHARD, *Preſident of the National Aſſembly*, is to be found in pp. 46, 47. of the ſame publication. After lamenting, indirectly, that the French Revolution did not meet with its juſt eſtimation from the Government of Great Britain, and wiſhing for the happy day when "Nations ſhall bluſh *at that perfidious ſcience*

"*which*

" *which has been decorated with the name of politics,*" he proceeds to obſerve, " *it is for men like you,* " *my Lord, it is for the worthy Members of your* " *Society that it is reſerved to haſten this new re-* " *volution*;" and the Preſident concludes with expreſſing the ſtrongeſt approbation of the Aſſembly *on the Reſolutions addreſſed to them by Lord Stanhope.*

I before declined entering upon any diſcuſſion of the note preſented by M. CHAUVELIN to Lord GRENVILLE on the 21ſt of May 1792, which you ſeem to conſider as entitled to almoſt the ſame degree of credit as holy writ, becauſe the unfortunate king, in whoſe name it was delivered, was at that time to all intents and purpoſes a priſoner, ſurrounded by Jacobin Miniſters, who made him utter whatever the National Aſſembly thought proper to dictate. You take for granted the truth of the ſtatement in the note, that *a great conſpiracy had been formed in Europe againſt France,* and that *troops had aſſembled on her frontiers evidently for the purpoſe of conſtraining her inhabitants to alter the form of the Government they had choſen.* I have already ſaid enough of the Declaration of PILNITZ, and of the circumſtances which preceded and followed it, to eſtabliſh the falſehood of theſe aſſertions: and if you had taken the trouble to read the debates of the National Aſſembly which led to the war, you would have been enabled to diſcover the truth. The members of that Aſſembly well knew the league, thus ſtigmatized, to be purely defenſive. As to the collection of troops by the Emperor on

the frontiers of France, ſo far from that circumſtance affording any real ground for apprehenſion to the party who were anxious for war, it is notorious that the magnitude of the French force on the frontiers, ſtated to amount to 100,000 men, and the extreme weakneſs of the Imperial army, had conſtituted one of the principal arguments uſed by BRISSOT on the 15th January 1792, for perſuading the government to declare war.

The note proceeds to diſavow all French emiſſaries employed in procuring proſelytes in foreign States, which, it juſtly obſerves, *would be a real violation of the law of nations*; and, alluding to the inſinuations contained in the Britiſh Proclamation, that a correſpondence had been carried on by diſaffected perſons here with certain French ſubjects, explicitly declares it to be *a proceeding wholly foreign to the French nation and to the Legiſlative Body,—a proceeding of which they are entirely ignorant, which militates againſt every principle of juſtice, and which, whenever it became known, would be univerſally condemned in France.* Yet had the Revolution Society communicated to the *National Aſſembly*, in July 1790, their correſpondence with the Jacobin Clubs of France, and *were loudly applauded!!!* In the preceding month alſo, that revolutionary maniac ANACHARSIS CLOOTS, and his motley train of *Ambaſſadors*, as he called them, from all the nations of the earth, were told by the Preſident of the National Aſſembly to return home and *make revolutions in their reſpective countries!!!*—But ſuch is the faith you repoſe in the

the veracity of Gallic Jacobins, that you receive all this impudent combination of recorded falſehoods as if it were pure goſpel.

In tracing your errors, miſrepreſentations, and perverſions, the mind is abſolutely loſt in amazement at their frequency and groſſneſs; and it is ſcarcely poſſible to conceive how a publication, which, I am credibly informed, was ſubmitted to the judgment of your party before it was ſent to the preſs, could be uſhered to the world in ſuch a ſtate. Adverting to the refuſal of the Britiſh Government to mediate between the Belligerent Powers, accompanied by an avowal of their determination not to interfere with the internal affairs of France, you ſay [11], this paper "*was written* ONLY "A FEW DAYS *before* M. CHAUVELIN *was ordered* "*to quit the kingdom.*" Lord GRENVILLE's note, here quoted, was written on the 8th of July 1792, and the order for M. CHAUVELIN to quit the kingdom was delivered to him on the 24th of January 1793!!!—*A few days!*—Your pen ſeems to operate as a kind of *political Teleſcope*, by means of which you approximate or remove objects as it ſuits your argument to magnify or diminiſh them.

I ſhould certainly deem it neceſſary to expoſe this ſtrange confuſion of dates, were it only for the purpoſe of proving your ſhameful inattention to your ſubject, and your conſequent incompetency to diſcuſs it. But I have a farther object to promote by the detection of your miſ-ſtatements; to diſcon-

[11] P. 35.

nect

nect the whole chain of your reaſoning, and to deſtroy the very groundwork of your arguments. It might be urged by your apologiſts that the error I have laſt noticed by no means affects the ſolidity of your inference, which is the eſtabliſhment of a difference between the profeſſions and the practice of the Britiſh Government, by ſtating that only a few days after they had expreſſed their determination not to interfere with the internal affairs of France, they ordered M. CHAUVELIN to quit the kingdom, *under circumſtances of direct interference*; therefore by ſubſtituting *months* for *days* the error would be removed and the fact remain the ſame. But that is not the caſe, for by the approximation of remote facts you artfully ſink all the *interveniug* circumſtances. Thus, admitting, for the ſake of argument, that CHAUVELIN's diſmiſſion was really an act of interference, as you ſtate it to be; ſtill I contend, that the circumſtances which occurred in the interval between the delivery of Lord GRENVILLE's note and the order for CHAUVELIN's departure, afforded a complete juſtification of the meaſure. At all events, it is certain the conduct of Government in this reſpect was regulated by thoſe circumſtances; and this, indeed, you afterwards acknowledge, ſo that your charge of interference might be juſt, and yet the conſequence you draw from it falſe and unjuſt.—But, before you ventured to repreſent the diſmiſſion of CHAUVELIN as an act of interference in the internal affairs of France, you would have done well to conſider the conduct of the French Republicans themſelves towards

towards the Ambaſſadors of America, Tuſcany, Geneva, Genoa, and Venice. Theſe, though the Sovereigns whom they repreſented were at peace and in alliance with the French, and though they had been received and acknowledged in their diplomatic capacity, were diſmiſſed in an arbitrary and contumelious manner. CHAUVELIN's letters of credence from his new maſters had never been received; his public functions had ceaſed; he remained here merely upon ſufferance in a private capacity; and his diſmiſſion from the kingdom as an alien could not poſſibly be regarded as an interference in the domeſtic Government of his country.

Continuing in the ſame ſtrain and in the ſame ſpirit, you remark that the refuſal to mediate with the Emperor was given *at the very ſame moment that* we were *involving* Holland in the horrors of war! Here again you bring ſeaſons in conjunction which Nature has kept ſeparate, and make ſummer and winter appear at *the very ſame moment*; for certain it is that no ſteps were taken to aſſiſt Holland until the winter was far advanced; and equally certain, that the defence of an Ally againſt the actual attack of an enemy is a ſingular mode of *involving her* in a war.

After the depoſition of LOUIS XVI. and the eſtabliſhment of a Republic, M. CHAUVELIN could no longer be conſidered by the Britiſh Government as a public character; ſtill, however, you admit that the Secretary of State maintained a correſpondence with him. And here let me remark,

mark, that as you cite the circumſtance of his not being recalled as " a pretty ſtrong proof that " France was not then deſirous of ſeeking a cauſe " for quarrel;" it ought to have occurred to you that his being ſuffered to remain here might ſtill more naturally be conſidered as a ſtrong proof that the Britiſh Government were anxious to avoid all pretext for hoſtility: but ſuch an admiſſion was foreign from your purpoſe. You proceed to enumerate the charges preferred by this country againſt France, as they appear to you, from a reference to the correſpondence above noticed. Among theſe charges you mention the proceedings of the Convention reſpecting the Scheldt, the decree of the 19th November, and the attack upon Holland; and you then obſerve, that "M. CHAUVE- " LIN *had* explained himſelf upon theſe ſubjects " in *the early part of the correſpondence* [12]." Here you are unintelligible. Do you mean the correſpondence before quoted, which took place in the months of May and July? How could that explain the decree of the 19th November, the other decree about the Scheldt of nearly the ſame date, and the attack upon Holland?—After that communication, (with the exception of two ſhort letters merely deſiring a conference,) no correſpondence paſſed between Lord GRENVILLE and M. CHAUVELIN until the *twenty-ſeventh of December*, a date which I muſt entreat you to bear in your recollection, as I ſhall preſently make it appear to

[12] P. 36.

be

be very material. And this conference could not allude to those decrees, because it was solicited before M. CHAUVELIN knew that they had passed, on the very day indeed on which the most important of them is dated,—the 19th of November 1792.

Your affirmation, that the letters of credence sent by the prevailing faction of the day to M. CHAUVELIN, who had suddenly transferred his allegiance from the Sovereign to his assassins, were refused for no other reasons than because France was a republic, is contrary to fact. They were refused because there were at that time two *parties* in France, and no one acknowledged *nation*, and because justice as well as a regard for our own safety compelled us to espouse the part of an infant and imprisoned King, and a proscribed Nobility and Clergy [13]; whereas the reception of M. CHAUVELIN'S

[13] In my first Letter to you, I shewed how far the opinions of the best writers on the Law of Nations justified the interference of one State in the domestic concerns of another; and I contended that such interference was, in certain cases, fully justified upon the principles of self-preservation. That your idol, Mr. Fox, had he been Minister when the Revolution happened, would not have espoused the cause of the Rebels, who had openly avowed their enmity to this country, and professed their determination to provoke us to war, but would, on the contrary, have declared himself in favour of the opposite party, we have the strongest reason to believe from his own recorded sentiments. It must be fresh in the memory of the Public, that the republican malecontents in Holland endeavoured to establish a revolution in 1787, on the ruins of the existing Government, but were prevented by a coalition of Kings, of which GEORGE the Third was one. His Majesty, in the ensuing Session of Parliament, explained, from the throne, the conduct he had pursued in order to preserve the lawful Government of Holland. Mr. Fox, in his comments on this Speech, declared, "For

LIN's credentials would have been tantamount to a declaration in favour of the oppoſite party, that is, in favour of rebels and aſſaſſins. It was natural that after ſuch an event as the murder of the lawful monarch of France, the King of Great Britain ſhould declare that he could no longer permit a man ſituated as CHAUVELIN then was, enjoying no official character, to remain in his dominions.

You ſtate, with ſome degree of exultation, that previous to the diſmiſſion of this man France was ſolicitous for peace, the very reverſe of which I proved, in my former letter, to be the fact; and that *ſhe had done none of the acts complained of in the correſpondence until her independence had been threatened by a hoſtile confederacy* [13]. This laſt aſſer-

" For myſelf, I do not think it neceſſary *to inquire into the lega-*
" *lity* of the conſtitution of a foreign ſtate. It is *ſufficient for*
" *me* to conſider which party is moſt inclined *to be friendly to*
" *Great Britain.*—Where there are two parties in a country,
" one of them hoſtile and another friendly to us, WE HAVE
" A RIGHT TO INTERFERE IN SUPPORT OF THAT WHICH
" IS FRIENDLY *." And he farther ſtated, " That he
" muſt contradict every political principle upon which he
" had hitherto acted, if he refuſed his approbation to the
" principal object of the Speech from the Throne;—thoſe
" principles which have been long ſtigmatiſed as romantic
" conſtitute the ſyſtem by which it is the true intereſt of this
" country to be governed †." Here Mr. Fox ſpoke like a true friend to the Britiſh conſtitution, ſtaunch to thoſe old principles to which it is indebted for its vigour and proſperity. I know that ſince the French Revolution he has holden different language, and maintained different principles; and therefore it is that I now conſider him as " fallen from his high eſtate," as the deſperate leader of a deſperate faction!!!

[13] P. 41.

* See the Parliamentary Debates for 1787. † New Annual Regiſter, p. 51.

tion is certainly true as to the *letter*, but totally falſe as to the *ſpirit*. The acts which formed the immediate ſubject of complaint were committed after the retreat of the DUKE OF BRUNSWICK, but others exactly of a ſimilar nature had been committed before the exiſtence of any confederacy whatever. Your next ſtatement, that ſhe had taken no ſteps inconſiſtent with her formal renunciation of conqueſt and aggrandiſement, but "*invaſions* "*of the territory of Princes confederating or confe-* "*derated againſt her*," is neither correct as to the letter nor as to the ſpirit. Numerous inſtances might be cited in demonſtration of its inaccuracy. Among others, let me aſk, what were the ſeizure of Avignon, the attack upon Geneva, and the invaſion of the territory of the DUKE OF DEUX-PONTS, againſt whom the decree of the 19th of November was particularly levelled, although he had ſpared no pains to preſerve his neutrality, even at the expence of his allegiance to the Emperor? What, too, was the attack on the *German Empire* itſelf, when war had been only declared againſt the *King of Hungary and Bohemia?*

Having finiſhed your *miſ*-ſtatement of facts previous to the diſmiſſion of *Citizen* CHAUVELIN, you ſuddenly revert back to the 12th of December when the Parliament met, and explain in your uſual way, that *Parliament was an entire ſtranger to the conciliatory declarations* [14], none of which, as I have ſhewn,

[14] P. 42. Perſevering in your *ſyſtem of inaccuracy*, you obſerve, p. 45. that *a few days after* Mr. Fox's motion for ſending an Ambaſſador

ſhewn, were delivered at the time. And upon this curious exclamation, which you enforce with all the power of *Italicks*, you found a train of argument, through which, of courſe, I ſhall not be expected to follow you.

There is one mode of argument to which the members of your party have had frequent recourſe, and which produces but too great an effect on a conſiderable part of mankind,—I mean, the aſſumption of a falſe fact, on which you reaſon as if it were an eſtabliſhed truth. Thus you declaim, I cannot ſay *argue*, on the happy conſequences which would have reſulted to Europe, " *if, inſtead of* " *inciting and encouraging the Princes of Europe* " *to invade France*[15], *we had become her ſecurity* " *againſt their invaſions, had taken a friendly yet* " *commanding part in the eſtabliſhment of her li-* " *berty, and had become the faithful but cautious* " *protector of her firſt revolution!*" Here the baſis of your reaſoning is, that we did really incite and encourage the invaſion of France; whereas it is a certain fact, though you may not poſſibly be acquainted with it, that ſo far from adopting ſuch a line of conduct, we had actually prevented Spain from joining in the confederacy, by refuſing to pledge ourſelves not to puſh the diſpute about the

Ambaſſador to Paris, the particulars of the correſpondence above noticed was communicated to Parliament by a meſſage from the King. Now Mr. Fox's motion was made on the 15th December, and the King's meſſage delivered on the 28th of January,—ſo that inſtead of a *few days* an interval of more than *ſix weeks* elapſed between the two events.

[15] P. 46.

furs of *Nootka* to an open war. Had we become the ſecurity of France againſt the reſt of Europe, we ſhould have become the guarantee of all her crimes, and *an acceſſary after the fact* to all her enormities; and had we taken *a commanding part* in her domeſtic concerns, we ſhould have been guilty of that very *interference* which you ſo ſtrongly reprobate, and have ſubjected ourſelves to the very ſame cenſures which were beſtowed by the ſecond Aſſembly on the Emperor, who, for the mere indication of a diſpoſition to obſerve the line of conduct which you have recommended, was ſtigmatiſed as a *Feuillant*[16].

Where you ſtumble, by chance, on a real fact, you ſo diſfigure it by fanciful decorations of your own, as to render it ſcarcely cognizable. This is the caſe with your obſervation, that *the ſhare which even* BRISSOT *had in the commencement of hoſtilities was the principal cauſe of his deſtruction, and the root of* ROBERSPIERRE'*s popularity*[17]. It is certain that BRISSOT and his aſſociates ſtand convicted, by their own confeſſion, of having provoked the war, for the purpoſe of aboliſhing the monarchy and eſtabliſhing a republic on its ruins; and it is alſo true, that this circumſtance conſtituted one of the charges preferred againſt BRISSOT on his trial. But it is abſurd to ſuppoſe that it was the principal cauſe of his deſtruction and of ROBERSPIERRE's popularity, becauſe ROBERSPIERRE followed in that reſpect the preciſe ſyſtem of policy

[16] See the Debates of the National Aſſembly. [17] P. 48.

which

which BRISSOT himſelf had preſcribed. We have the authority of Madame ROLAND, which is certainly deciſive *quoad hoc*, for aſſerting, that DANTON was the man who overthrew the Briſſotines, by monopoliſing the appointment of all the Revolutionary Agents after the tenth of Auguſt 1792. As to ROBERSPIERRE, it is notorious, at this time, that the ſyſtem of terror formed both the baſis and ſupport of his popularity.

I now proceed, Sir, to the examination of miſ-ſtatements of a different nature; miſ-ſtatements which cannot be imputed to a failure of recollection, but which muſt inevitably fix upon you the charge of infidelity. After commenting, in your own manner, on the efforts of Meſſrs. Fox and GREY, in the winter of 1793, to perſuade the King to diſgrace himſelf and his people by eſpouſing the cauſe of the regicide faction at Paris, you obſerve, that "his Majeſty's Miniſters, on the "21ſt of January, *with greater ſincerity than has* "*in general characteriſed their proceedings, boldly* "*and plainly avowed the principle* on which the "war had been begun, and was to be proſecuted, "viz. *To oppoſe that wild and deſtructive ſyſtem of* "*rapine, anarchy, impiety, and irreligion, the* "*effects of which, as they had been manifeſted in* "*France, furniſhed a dreadful but uſeful leſſon to* "*the preſent age and poſterity*[18]." This is, indiſputably, the moſt garbled and falſified quotation that the advocate of any party ever ventured to bring forward in the field of diſputation. And

[18] P. 69.

you have the modeſty to affirm, that " this decla-
" ration of Miniſters *directly refuted their own un-*
" *founded aſſertion, that the war had proceeded*
" *from France*[19]." I will endeavour to enable the Public to decide what credit is due to your affirmations; and if the expoſure of the moſt groſs perverſion can raiſe a bluſh on the cheek of a partiſan, yours ſhall be tinged with the dye of ſhame. The whole paſſage of the King's Speech, of which you have profeſſed to give a part, is as follows: " My
" Lords and Gentlemen—In all your deliberations,
" you will undoubtedly bear in mind the true
" grounds and origin of the war.

" AN ATTACK WAS MADE ON US, AND ON OUR
" ALLIES, *founded on principles which tend to de-*
" *ſtroy all property, to ſubvert the laws and reli-*
" *gion of every civiliſed nation, and to introduce*
" *univerſally that wild and deſtructive ſyſtem,*"
&c. &c. &c.

Here the reader will perceive that, ſo far from any thing like a *refutation* of the juſt affirmation that the war had proceeded from France, the King expreſsly aſſerts that our enemies were the aggreſſors. What you mean by obſerving, that not a word is ſaid in the Speech " upon the footing of
" territory and conqueſt, although Mentz had
" been recaptured, and ſoon after Valenciennes,
" Condé, and Queſnoy taken, and although
" Holland had been delivered from an impending
" invaſion," I cannot divine. The fact is, that the Speech, at the very outſet, particularly men-

[19] P. 70.

tions

tions the recovery of the Netherlands, the recapture of Mentz, and the preſervation of Holland. His Majeſty alſo (after regreting the neceſſary continuance of the war) ſays, he ſhould ill conſult the eſſential intereſts of his people, if he were deſirous of peace on any grounds but ſuch as may provide for their permanent ſafety, and for the *independence and ſecurity of Europe*. It muſt farther be remembered, that the King then proceeds to lay before Parliament a copy of his Declaration of October 1793, which contains *all the grounds of the war* fully diſcuſſed.

In your extreme anxiety to degrade the Government in the eyes of the nation, you repreſent the Miniſters as "*aſking for peace, but aſking for it in "vain*[20];" which is a direct confeſſion, that the continuance of the war is not to be imputed as a fault to them; a confeſſion which totally deſtroys the effect of all the latter part of your pamphlet.

But you are not always ſo explicit. A few pages after you make the French Government, not inaptly indeed, talk quite unintelligibly: you make them aſk the Britiſh Miniſters, "What have we to "do with the terms of a treaty *between the Emperor "and England, which had our utter deſtruction as "a nation for its foundation?* and if, as you aſſert, "(*perhaps with reaſon,*) that it is inadmiſſible for "France to ſet up the annexation of Belgium, and "the demands *of her Conſtitution*, as a bar to the "propoſed retroceſſion, it is no leſs inadmiſſible "for Great Britain to ſet up *her own treaties with*

[20] P. 72.

" *belligerent nations made without the conſent of*
" *France, and made only for her deſtruction, as*
" HER *ultimatum for the reſtoration of the peace*
" *which ſhe propoſes*[21]." The meaning of this ſenſeleſs charge I confeſs myſelf wholly unable to comprehend. What was our *ultimatum*, according to your own remark?—*the reſtoration of the Netherlands to their original and lawful Sovereign, the Emperor.* Was this a ſtipulation made " *for* " *the deſtruction of France?*" If there had been any ſuch ſtipulation, (which I deny, for our Treaty with Auſtria was purely *defenſive*, after both States had been attacked by the French,) it was expreſsly abandoned, inſtead of enforced, by ſuch an *ultimatum* as the *ſtatus quo ante bellum!*

On the conduct of Adminiſtration after the eſtabliſhment of the laſt new Conſtitution in France, you attempt to be facetious, thinking, I preſume, that humour is a good ſubſtitute for fact, and wit for reaſon. As any attempt at compreſſion would be an act of injuſtice to you, I ſhall quote the paſſage in your own language: " As the " anarchy of France was *in a manner admitted to* " *be at an end*, what was to come next? A " Government capable of maintaining the rela- " tions of amity? No! *This concluſion would* " *have been too rapid a motion towards a negotia-* " *tion.* We were therefore told, " *That the* " *diſtraction and anarchy which had prevailed in* " *France had led to a criſis, of which it was as*

[21] P. 77.

" *yet*

" *yet impoſſible to foreſee the iſſue; but which, in* " *all human probability, muſt produce conſequences* " *highly important to the intereſts of Europe.*" This " bold and *penetrating* declaration led the way, as " might be expected, to *the old neceſſity of proſecuting* " *the war with vigour and alacrity*[22]." Here you have again garbled the King's Speech, quoting only ſuch part of it as would ſuit the purpoſe of miſrepreſentation, and ſeparating it from that which would tend to elucidate the poſition, and ſupply the means of confuting your argument. If that were not your object, why did you ſuppreſs the paſſage that immediately follows? It is this: " Should this criſis terminate in any order of " things compatible with the tranquillity of other " countries, and affording a reaſonable expectation " of ſecurity and permanence in any treaty which " might be concluded, *the appearance of a diſpo-* " *ſition to negotiate for a general peace, on juſt and* " *ſuitable terms, would not fail to be met, on my* " *part, with an earneſt deſire to give it the fulleſt* " *and* SPEEDIEST *effect.*" There is *policy* at leaſt in your ſuppreſſion of this paſſage, becauſe it nearly overturns all your reaſoning on the ſubject, and certainly diſplays your cenſure of Miniſters for not adviſing his Majeſty *to connect the communication of this important event* (the eſtabliſhment of the new Conſtitution in France) *with the proſpect of immediate peace* in a moſt awkward point of view.

I have little more to ſay on the ſubject of the correſpondence which paſſed between M. BARTHELEMY

[22] P. 82.

THELEMY and Mr. WICKHAM at Baſil, and on which, by the bye, Mr. BURKE beſtowed ſome ſtrong comments in his laſt pamphlet, which you did not dare to notice. The anſwer then given by the French, like that afterwards given to Lord MALMESBURY, as you obſerve, placed the French Conſtitution as a bar to the ceſſion of any part *of the territory of the Republic, but in other reſpects invited negotiations.* Now it is worthy of notice, that "in the territory of the Republic" was included all which they had wreſted from the Emperor, and *all their colonies and foreign ſettlements in both Indies then actually poſſeſſed by us.* What then, let me aſk, would have remained for *negotiation in other reſpects?* And what could the Directory mean by receiving overtures as to other intereſts, political and *commercial*, which ſhould be compatible with *the dignity of the Republic?* On this phraſe Mr. BURKE laid great ſtreſs, and expatiated with conſiderable energy; and *therefore* you left it wholly unnoticed. Yet, notwithſtanding a declaration that betrays their ambition but too plainly, you contend, that the Directory *never* meant that mutual compenſations ſhould not be the baſis of the propoſed peace. But the fact is, and all the proceedings of the French Government place it beyond a doubt, that their plain meaning ever was, and ſtill is, that *peace* (if they will condeſcend to grant it at all) *is to be the only compenſation* for all the ſacrifices which they demand of us.

You labour hard to fix a charge of inſincerity on our Miniſters in the negotiations which they opened at Paris, through the medium of Lord

MALMES-

MALMESBURY, in the autumn of laſt year, and to ſhew, that a change took place in our Councils in conſequence of the Archduke's victories, while the Britiſh Plenipotentiary was actually at Paris. With what *candour* you urge this imputation, and with what *ſucceſs* your attack is attended, I ſhall briefly demonſtrate. You ſay[23], "*When the embaſſy was firſt* "*projected, we were in the loweſt ebb of diſgrace* "*and misfortune: our laſt Ally, the Emperor, was* "*likely to be even beſieged in his capital: but whilſt* "*Lord* MALMESBURY *was at Paris, the unex-* "*ampled ſpirit and gallantry of the Archduke* "CHARLES *changed the face of things; and the* "*ſeaſon became favourable for negotiation to lie* "*upon its oars.*" All theſe aſſertions are directly contrary to fact. The Gazette of the 6th of September contains an account of the two firſt important victories obtained by the ARCHDUKE over JOURDAN, in the vicinity of Amberg, and the rout of the French army; and Lord GRENVILLE'S firſt letter to the Daniſh Ambaſſador, requeſting him to apply to the French Government for a paſſport, is dated on that very day! On the 24th of September Lord GRENVILLE made his *ſecond* application for a paſſport; and the Gazette of the *preceding day* (the 23d) contained a confirmation of the ARCHDUKE'S grand victory near Wurtzburg, an account of another victory near Aſchaffenbourg, and of the diſperſion of JOURDAN'S army, purſued and attacked in all quarters, as well by the peaſantry as by the Auſtrian troops. The ſame Ga-

[23] P. 100.

zette alſo contained an account of MOREAU having been repulſed in an attack on the Prince of FURSTENBERG, and of his conſequent *preparations for a ſpeedy retreat.* The Executive Directory did not come to a determination on the ſubject of Lord GRENVILLE's letter of the 24th, until the 30th of September; nor did they communicate that determination before the 2d of the following month; by which time they muſt have been appriſed of the complete diſſolution of JOURDAN's army, and of the imminent danger to which that of MOREAU was expoſed. Lord MALMESBURY did not reach Paris till the 21ſt of October, when MOREAU's retreat muſt have been nearly effected. If, then, the military events in Germany had any influence on the conduct of either Government, it is evident that it muſt have been on that of France. Hence we may account for the *condeſcenſion* of theſe haughty Republicans in ſuffering our Ambaſſador to repair to their metropolis; and for their ſubſequent chicanery on receiving the news of MOREAU's ſafety, and of the reſtoration of JOURDAN's army to at leaſt a poſture of defence. Our conduct (as far as it could be affected by the ARCHDUKE's victories) could only be intended to profit by the firſt favourable turn, in order to make a diſplay of our moderation. It is ſomewhat ſingular, that a miſrepreſentation ſo flagrant of a fact ſo recent ſhould have been ſince repeated by Mr. Fox in the courſe of debate; and ſtill more ſingular, that the Miniſter ſhould have ſuffered it to paſs without contradiction or notice. Thus it is, that, from the daring

effrontery

effrontery of ſome, and the culpable inattention of others, falſehood aſſumes the confidence of truth, and credit is given to perverſion and impoſture.

In diſcuſſing the negotiation at Paris, with the ſame attention to fact that is diſplayed in the paſſage above noticed, you mention the extraordinary demand of an *ultimatum*[24], by the Directory, in an early part of the negotiation, as being limited, in its reference, to the Auſtrian Netherlands, and not as a requiſition of *an ultimatum upon every collateral point of negotiation*[25]. Yet that is the only true uſe of the term *ultimatum*. You then ſeek to ſupport your own interpretation by the following paſſage from Lord MALMESBURY's note to DE LA CROIX: "*He therefore can add nothing to the aſ-*
"*ſurances which he has already given to the Miniſter*
"*for Foreign Affairs, as well by word of mouth as*
"*in his official note.*" But if you had quoted the whole of this paſſage, it would not have been poſſible for you to give to the words the ſenſe which you have ventured to aſſign to them. Lord MALMESBURY obſerves, firſt, that to inſiſt on an *ultimatum* before diſcuſſion, is to ſhut the door againſt all negotiation. He then proceeds as above, and (after a *ſemicolon* where you have put a *period*) continues thus: "and he *repeats*, that he "is ready to enter with that Miniſter into every

[24] You confound two things which are perfectly diſtinct in *Diplomacy*, viz. a *ſine quâ non* and an *ultimatum*. A common Lawyer might naturally have been expected to be rather more converſant with the law of nations.

[25] P. 102.

"explanation

" explanation of which the ſtate and progreſs of " the negotiation may admit, and that he will not " fail to enter into the diſcuſſion of the propoſals of " his Court, *or of any counter-projeƈt* which may " be delivered to him on the part of the Executive " Directory, with that candour and ſpirit of con- " ciliation which correſpond with the juſt and pa- " cific ſentiments of his Court." The reply of the Directory to this communication was, as you ſtate, " that they would liſten to no propoſal con- " trary to the conſtitution, to the laws, and to the " treaties which bind the Republic;" which was tantamount to a poſitive aſſertion of their right to annul, by their private treaties, the known proviſions of the law of nations, and in ſhort to legiſlate for Europe—an arrogant and deſtructive pretenſion, to which if ever Great Britain ſhould deſcend to afford a ſanction, directly or indirectly, the ſun of her glory will be ſet for ever! In your own jargon, you term this anſwer " an *ultimatum* againſt an " *ultimatum on a particular point*[26];" by which " the negotiation was *brought to an inevitable* " *concluſion.*" The fact was, that the Executive Directory had then juſt received intelligence of the ſailing of the armament, under HOCHE, deſtined to act againſt Ireland. It ſailed from Breſt on the *ſixteenth*, and on the *twentieth* Lord MALMESBURY was diſmiſſed. As ſoon as they thought themſelves prepared for the attack, they pulled off the maſk, and ſhewed themſelves in their true colours.

[26] P. 103.

So

So much, Sir, for your errors, perverſions, and miſrepreſentations, which I ſhould not have taken the trouble to detect, if the critics had performed what I conceive to be their duty; but this, indeed, is ſcarcely to be expected in an age when critics, become partiſans, are leſs anxious to expoſe the defects or to point out the merits of a work, than to promote or obſtruct its circulation. DRYDEN juſtly obſerves, "that *criticiſm*, as it was firſt inſtituted by ARISTOTLE, was meant a ſtandard of *judging well*[27]." I am ſorry to ſay that it has now a very different meaning indeed.

Having confuted, or, at leaſt, endeavoured to confute, every argument you have advanced on the ſubject of the war, it only remains to conſider your opinion on the topic of peace. According to you, the balance of power, and the augmentation of our enemy's ſtrength, are but mere ſecondary conſiderations, and all that is to be attended to by our Government, all that is of real conſequence to the nation in completing the grand work of peace, is ITS SPIRIT AND TEMPER[28]." In ſupport of this extraordinary doctrine you quote Mr. BURKE, who, alluding to our treaty with the

[27] Preface to Dryden's *Innocence*.

[28] P. 116. You ſay the ceſſion of Belgium to the Emperor, the arrangement concerning St. Domingo, *or* any other ſpecific line of negotiation, *are* but as duſt in the balance, &c.—Theſe trifling grammatical errors are beneath the notice of *modern critics*, though, if committed by a boy at Eton twelve years old, they would certainly incur a ſevere chaſtiſement. But the Etonians are found ſcholars independently of politics, and found politicians independently of ſcholarſhip;—would I could ſay as much of the critics!

American

American Colonies, obſerved, that it ſhould be formed "*in the ſpirit of peace, and laid in prin-* "*ciples purely pacific*;" but before you applied theſe words, it behoved you to ſhew that our relative ſituation with France at this period is the ſame as our relative ſituation with America was at that time, and this I defy you to do.

As to the *ſpirit and temper* of a peace, I conceive they can be of very little conſequence unleſs they are *reciprocal*. That this is not likely to be the caſe, in the preſent inſtance, will appear from the curious review of your own pamphlet which was inſerted in the *Redacteur* of the 24th April laſt, a paper notoriouſly in the pay of the French Government, and the vehicle of their ſentiments. As I have no doubt that it will be highly gratifying to *you* to peruſe the complimentary paſſages with which this critique is copiouſly interſperſed,—though they are not the firſt compliments which you have received from *Gallic regicides*,—I ſhall take the trouble of tranſcribing it at length.

"It is very pleaſing *to the friends of the Republic* "to ſee one of the firſt orators of England, and "an ornament to the bar, defend thoſe memor- "able events which are already attacked with ſo "much violence among *ourſelves*;"—(here, Sir, we find, that you have undertaken to defend thoſe very tranſactions which the moſt honeſt of the French Republicans themſelves have not only deemed indefenſible but worthy of reprobation!)— "deſcribe with equal force and *perſpicuity*" (riſum teneatis?) "the line which ſeparates royalty from "a go-

" a government that is perfectly repreſentative; " demonſtrate with *enthuſiaſm*" (the *perſpicuous* Mr. ERSKINE an *enthuſiaſt!* downright calumny!) " the advantages of the latter ſyſtem, which does " not confound itſelf with anarchy as the friends of " kings aſſert, and as the partiſans of diſorder " deſire;—to ſee him finally *prove* that a counter- " revolution in France is impracticable; and " that the return of the emigrants is impoſ- " ſible;" (there is a ſtrange difference between your *proofs* and the recent *aſſertion* of MASSENA's troops, who poſitively affirm that the emigrants are conſtantly returning; but *you* muſt be right, for you never ſpeak *at random*;) " and " that if the Directory ſhould relinquiſh the " Auſtrian Netherlands, without an irreſiſtible, an " abſolute neceſſity, they will, at the ſame time, " alſo ſacrifice the republic." (Who after this will *dare* to ſay that you plead the cauſe of the French?)

" Theſe propoſitions may, perhaps, injure Mr. " ERSKINE in the opinions of certain people," (Non, non, çela eſt tout à fait impoſſible,) " as Monſ. " CALONNE maintains contrary propoſitions, and " as the preſſes at Hamburgh, under the influence " of the Pretender, inceſſantly labour to oppoſe " them."

" When Mr. ERSKINE talks on *the baſis of* " *peace*, and on the means of conſolidating it, there " is no *enlightened and ſenſible man* that does not " fully accede to the juſtice of his poſition. A " peace çertainly cannot be ſolid, particularly

 " between

" between two nations which have always been " rivals, except when its foundations are laid in a " truly pacific diſpoſition, and when the two " cabinets eagerly ſtrive to extinguiſh every par- " ticle of diſcord. Theſe were the principles " which actuated Lord SHELBURNE" (the Marquis of LANSDOWNE, I apprehend, could tell a different ſtory) " and M. DE VERGENNES when " they preſided at the negotiations for the laſt " peace. But after a war like the preſent, a war " in which all the reſentments of civil diſcord are " combined, *can it be expected that the reconcilia-* " *tion can be as complete, as ſincere,* as it is after " thoſe wars in which complicated intereſts, al- " moſt unknown to the great maſs of the citizens, " formed the ſubject of diſpute? There is ſtill to " be ſeen at Boſton a public building, in the front " of which, the American troops that oppoſed the " landing of the Engliſh were drawn up, and the " walls of which are ſtill ſtained with the blood of " thoſe citizens who were deſtroyed by the guns " of the enemy's ſhips. There is not a ſingle " American whom this ſight does not inſpire with " a continually-increaſing hatred of the Britiſh " Government." (Thanks to the manly and ſpirited efforts of PETER PORCUPINE, and to the baſe and tyrannical conduct of the Gallic Directors, the *French* Government is, at this time, more an object of hatred with the Americans than the *Britiſh* Government.) " In the ſame manner do " La Vendeé and St. Domingo preſent their aſhes, " do Lyons and Toulon exhibit their ruins, and

" Quiberon

" Quiberon its graves to our ſight; and ſo long " as each of us ſhall think of his wounds, his " afflictions, or his loſſes, *where is the Frenchman* " *who will not feel a ſecret horror at hearing the* " *name of his moſt cruel enemy pronounced?*"

Thus we ſee, that although the din of arms ſhall have ceaſed, and the ſword have returned to its ſcabbard, ſtill the very name of an Engliſhman will excite horror in the mind of a Gallic republican! Such are the *temper and ſpirit* with which any pacific diſpoſition on our part will be met by our enemies! But what elſe, indeed, could be expected by any man who had a competent knowledge of human nature? The French ever have been our enemies, and, as Mr. Fox juſtly obſerved in 1787, *ever will be*; their animoſity is fixed and irradicable. So let it remain; and let no one pretend to give to enmity the maſk of friendſhip; the reality can never injure us; the deluſion may. Before you can produce a change in this diſpoſition of the French, you muſt mould the human mind anew. The political projects of the good Abbé de ST. PIERRE were aptly characteriſed by the Cardinal DUBOIS, as *The Dreams of a virtuous Man*; and I am ſtrongly diſpoſed to give the ſame appellation to your pacific lucubrations.

One conſideration, however, occurs on this topic on which you have unaccountably neglected to enlarge. You deem any ſacrifice of territory that *we* can make " as duſt in the balance when " compared with the ſpirit and temper of the " peace." But as ſuch ſpirit and temper muſt,

as I before obſerved, be *mutual*, in order to produce any beneficial effect, how comes it that you have not endeavoured to impreſs on the minds of the *French* the neceſſity of making ſome ſacrifices in order to produce them? Is the obligation, in this, as in ſo many other reſpects, to be confined to us? Are we to humble ourſelves before theſe omnipotent republicans, and to lay the honour and the intereſts of our country at their feet, in order to allay their enmity and to ſecure their protection? Is the genius of Britain ſo fallen? Is the ſpirit of Britons ſo debaſed? Heaven forbid!

Much, indeed, depends on the ſpirit and temper not of the peace, but which Engliſhmen ſhall diſplay after its concluſion. All the dangers which preceded, all the perils which accompanied the war, will be literally "as duſt in the balance," when compared with the riſks to which our country will be expoſed on its termination. I adverted ſlightly to this topic in my former Letter, and I ſhould here expatiate as largely upon it as its immenſe importance requires, had it not ſince engaged the attention of a writer who is fully aware of its conſequence, and who has done it ample juſtice[29].

The means which have been employed by the Government of France for promoting a revolution in this country, during the war, will be augmented

[29] See "Remarks preparatory to the Iſſue of the renewed "Negotiations for Peace." This is the production of that truly philoſophic mind to which the public is indebted for "The Origin of Duty and Right in Man conſidered," and of "A ſhort Argument on the Adminiſtration of Oaths."

in

in a tenfold degree on the return of peace. Their preſent efforts have been juſtly deſcribed by one who knows them well,—who knows them *intus et in cute*. "They inceſſantly attack," ſays this able writer, "by a multiplicity of agents, intrigues, and "exertions, the fidelity of the people, and the ſta- "bility of their laws; the ſpirit of party has en- "liſted under their banners, and poſſibly without "intending it; one ſtep farther, and they will "find themſelves in alliance with thoſe eighty "thouſand Jacobins whoſe exiſtence has been "proclaimed by Mr. BURKE, and who are no- "thing more than eighty thouſand ſervants of the "Directory. Who knows even, whether plots "more active, more perſonal, will not be directed "againſt the King and the principal members of "the Government? Is there a crime of which the "propoſition, the examination, or the adoption, may "not be daily found in the political ledger of the "adminiſtrators of the republican revolution [30]?"

Theſe clandeſtine manœuvres will be continued with additional vigour, and with a much better proſpect of ſucceſs after the ceſſation of hoſtilities. It is notorious that a regular band of political miſſionaries are kept in pay by the Directory, and diſperſed in all the great cities of Europe; and it is their buſineſs to propagate the deſtructive prin-

[30] "Letter to a Miniſter of State," &c. by MALLET DU PAN. Tranſlation, p. 33. Some of the minor critics, with their uſual ſagacity, have diſcovered that this ſpirited and ſenſible Letter was not written by MALLET DU PAN;—I can only ſay that the original was ſent to me by that gentleman's ſon, as the avowed production of his father.

ciples of equality, and to ſow the ſeeds of diſaffection wherever they go. The ſucceſs of their doctrines has but too fatally appeared in Italy, where the moſt obnoxious part of ROBERSPIERRE's political ſyſtem, which no man in this country has *yet* been found bold enough to juſtify, has been rigidly enforced by a Government which profeſſes to be actuated by principles of moderation and juſtice.

Wherever the French have triumphed, either by their arms or their intrigues, the immediate conſequence has been the overthrow of all the exiſting inſtitutions of the country. At Geneva, and Genoa; in the Venetian territory, and in the Milaneſe, this has been the caſe; even the little republic of Lucca has fallen a prey to the revolutionary rage; the independence of Sardinia and Tuſcany has been invaded; the Papal power is threatened with annihilation, and Naples, as MALLET DU PAN juſtly obſerves, has now, "thanks to French intrigues, "more moral than natural volcanoes on her ter-"ritory."

Many of theſe States have not merely obſerved the moſt rigid neutrality during the war, but have rendered the moſt eſſential aſſiſtance to the French.

If, then, *they* who had received repeated aſſurances of friendſhip and protection, could not eſcape the fury of theſe modern Goths, what reaſon have *we*, againſt whom they have conſtantly, to our honour be it ſpoken, avowed the moſt inveterate enmity, to expect an exemption from the effects of their rage? Firm to the principles of the firſt deſtroyers of the monarchy, the preſent

preſent Government of France are intent on promoting the general revolution of Europe. The famous decrees paſſed in November and December 1792, though Mr. Fox ventured to declare in Parliament that they had been repealed, and his declaration, ſtrange to ſay, was ſuffered to paſs uncontradicted, remain in full force at the preſent hour, and have been acted upon in every country where the French have gained an aſcendancy. The inhabitants of the Valteline *recently* juſtified their inſurrection by declaring, " *that liberty belonged to* " *them* BECAUSE *the natural rights of every nation* " *had been proclaimed by the French Republic ! ! !*" The ſame Republic has alſo proclaimed, with equal ſolemnity, that the people of England ought to be " detached from their infernal Government;" and there can be no doubt that the diſaffected in this country would be as ready as the inhabitants of the Valteline to avail themſelves of ſuch proclamation, in ſupport of a rebellion, ſhould ever an opportunity offer.

In ſhort, nothing leſs, I am convinced, than the political exiſtence of England depends on the precautions to be adopted on the concluſion of a peace with France. The Alien bill, which has been moſt unjuſtly condemned by the enemies of adminiſtration,—a bill which only gave to the Britiſh Government powers which every other Government in Europe had always exerciſed without control, and which the French Republic itſelf has exerciſed, in the utmoſt extent, from the firſt moment of its creation,—ſhould be rendered per-

petual, and its proviſions be enforced with the greateſt vigilance and rigour. A cargo of goods from a country afflicted with the plague will be infinitely leſs dangerous than a cargo of Gallic reformers; Mr. FRANCIS, a Member of Oppoſition, and, I believe, a friend of yours, once ſaid in the Houſe of Commons, "My ſerious and deliberate "conviction is, that the nearer the two nations "are drawn in contact, *and the more ſucceſsfully* "*they are invited to mingle and to blend with one* "*another*," (or in modern ſtyle to *fraternize*,) "in the ſame proportion the remaining morals, "principles, and vigour of the national Engliſh "mind will be enervated and *corrupted*." This is a ſolemn truth that ought to be engraven on tables of braſs in every place of public reſort, and indelibly impreſſed on the mind of every true Engliſhman. Heaven forbid, that, at a moment ſo pregnant with danger, the genius of Britain ſhould ſleep! All perſons of property who are anxious to retain the conſtitution that gives it ſecurity; every friend to religion and order, who wiſhes to preſerve that ſyſtem which protects the one and ſecures the other, ſhould ſtand forth at ſuch a criſis, and imperatively call on the Legiſlature to frame ſuch regulations as the urgency of the times ſhall be found to require. Let the French nurſe as they pleaſe the deformed offspring of their own fantaſtical brains, ſo that the *effects* of their care are confined to *themſelves*; but it will be our buſineſs to protect the venerable parent of our greatneſs and proſperity from foreign inſult

and

and domeſtic injury; to encircle her with an impenetrable barrier that ſhall render her *ære perennior*, and effectually ſcreen her from the contagious touch of Gallic philoſophy, and the polluted breath of Hiberpian reform. On this occaſion, when the object of my ſolicitude is ſo highly important to the welfare and happineſs of my countrymen, I may be allowed to exclaim, "Oh! "for the warning voice of the APOCALYPSE [31]!"

By one who long ſince warned all the powers of Europe of the fatal conſequences of the progreſs of the revolutionary ſpirit, we have been told that the French Government rely for the ſucceſs of their ſchemes "on that longing after peace, proclaimed "even on the firſt day of the war, which is a "ſymptom of the failure of all courage, of all "reaſon, of all public ſpirit, propagated with in-"defatigable induſtry, and in the clamours of "which the conſpirators, the factious, the revolu-"tioniſts of all countries join, forming an echo "to the EGOTISTS, and to thoſe nations which "have not had the courage to defend themſelves." You, Sir, have diſplayed this dangerous ſpirit, and contributed eſſentially to its propagation. I pointed out its pernicious effects at the time, and the conduct of the Directory, during the preſent

[31] "We have every thing to loſe. We have under our own "form of Government, comfort, protection, honour, ſecurity, "and happineſs. The price of preſerving them is very great, "but the price of anarchy, reform, and *inextricable* confuſion "would be greater beyond all calculation." *Purſuits of Literature*, 4th Part, p. 101. note.

negotiation,

negotiation, has completely verified my predictions. But for the encouragement which they received from the frequent aſſertions of your party, and particularly from your own inconſiderate affirmation, that an immediate peace could alone reſcue this country from deſtruction, would they have dared to propoſe the prepoſterous terms which they have advanced to the Britiſh Plenipotentiary at Liſle?—Can the French Government be ſincere in their wiſhes for peace, when the conditions which they preſcribe are nothing leſs than a reſtitution of all the ſettlements we have taken during the courſe of the war, not only from them, but from their allies? And on what plan is this reſtitution inſiſted on? Not as a conſideration for other poſſeſſions to be returned to us,—for they have taken nothing from us,—but, forſooth, becauſe *their* conſtitution and *their* treaties require ſuch a ſacrifice!—So monſtrous a claim, it was reſerved for the French Republic, which has made it an eſſential part of her ſyſtem to overturn all eſtabliſhed forms, and to introduce, in all her treaties and relations with foreign powers, new and unheard-of principles, to advance! The exiſtence of a *Droit public* in Europe, paramount to any *Droit public* which the French may have choſen to eſtabliſh in their own dominions, was properly urged by Lord MALMESBURY, during the negotiation at Paris. But it ſuits not their plan, it ſquares not with their deſigns, to admit the exiſtence of any laws paramount or *equal* to their own; the power that aſpires to univerſal empire naturally ſeeks to deſtroy

deſtroy all thoſe maxims and inſtitutions which operate as impediments to the ſucceſs of its plan. Every deviation which the French extort from eſtabliſhed rules, is with them an eſſential point gained, becauſe it accuſtoms the inhabitants of other countries to loſe that reſpect which they have been uſed to entertain for the practices of their forefathers, and to view, without dread or diſguſt, thoſe dangerous innovations which may be juſtly conſidered as the elementary principles of revolution.

If the plea advanced on the preſent occaſion were once to be admitted, what a ſtrong temptation would ſuch admiſſion afford to the French for engaging in future wars! They might then attack any independent power with a proſpect of advantage, and with a certainty of ſuſtaining no loſs. Should ſucceſs favour their arms, the poſſeſſions acquired by the fortune of war need only be annexed to the republic by a conſtitutional law, and precedent might be pleaded in ſupport of its retention; while the ſame plea might be urged, with equal force, for the recovery of any portion of her dominions which an enemy might wreſt from her in the courſe of the conteſt!!!

What is the relative ſituation of the two countries at the period when theſe monſtrous propoſitions are brought forward? France poſſeſſed, indeed, of an immenſe acceſſion of territory, but of a territory which, though it muſt be conſidered as a ſource of future greatneſs and proſperity, is ſo far exhauſted as to afford her no preſent reſources for continuing the war; deprived, by her peace with

with the continental powers, though concluded on terms the moſt advantageous to herſelf, of the means which ſhe has hitherto enjoyed of ſubſiſting her armies on the plunder of foreign ſtates; her trade and manufactures deſtroyed, her credit annihilated, her navy crippled, her energy palſied by inteſtine diviſions, and reduced, according to the ſtatement of her own rulers, to ſuch a ſtate of diſtreſs, as to be unable to defray the ordinary expences of Government, to provide money for the troops, or even to ſupply food for her ſick and poor [32]. On the other hand, Great Britain has not only preſerved her own territory entire, but has wreſted from France and Holland their moſt valuable colonies in either India, and has made Spain alſo feel the weight of her arms; her navy, conſiderably augmented by captures from each of her enemies, diſplays a force unequalled in the annals of naval power; her flag, triumphant in every quarter, aſſerts her now undiſputed empire of that ſea which ſurrounds and protects her; her ſquadrons block up the ports of France, Spain, and Holland, whoſe fleets ſhrink from the conteſt, not daring to encounter a foe whoſe ſuperior proweſs they have ſo often experienced; her ſupplies for the year provided; her trade, her manufactures, and her commerce flouriſhing; and her reſources for continuing the conteſt ſtill unexhauſted.

Poſſeſſed of ſuch a ſuperiority over our enemy, we have certainly a right to inſiſt on ſafe and

[32] See the meſſage of the Executive Directory to the Council of Five Hundred, at the beginning of the month of Auguſt 1797.

honourable

honourable terms of peace. What terms would be exacted by France were our reſpective ſituations reverſed, we know from the conditions which ſhe has impoſed on the Emperor. It undoubtedly becomes us to conſider the conſequence which the acquiſition of the Auſtrian Netherlands will produce on the commercial and political intereſts of this country; the wiſeſt ſtateſmen of paſt times regarded the poſſeſſion of that territory by France as a fatal blow to the proſperity of England; and if the ſame magnanimous ſpirit which prevailed in former wars continued ſtill to ſubſiſt among the people of Great Britain, the French would not have been ſuffered to retain it. The French republicans themſelves are fully aware of its importance, but they chiefly value it for the means which it affords them of injuring the trade of England [33].

It is in vain, however, in the preſent ſtate of affairs, to think of continuing the war for the purpoſe of detaching the Auſtrian Netherlands from France. But it is our duty to avail ourſelves of the advantages which we poſſeſs, in order to render that acceſſion of power by our enemy as little detrimental to the intereſts of England as the actual ſituation of things will admit. This can only be done by retaining ſome of the poſſeſſions which the fortune of war has thrown into our hands, thereby to afford ſecurity and extenſion to our foreign

[33] See on this ſubject, PUBLICOLA CHAUSSARD's Hiſtorical and Political Memoirs of Belgium, and MERLIN's Report to the Convention on the 1ſt of November 1794.

trade,

trade, and to open new markets for our manufactures, in lieu of thoſe whence they will in all probability be excluded, at leaſt partially, in conſequence of the immenſe advantages in point of territory, extent of coaſt, and inland communication, which the French have acquired by their treaties with the continental powers. I will not for a moment admit the ſuppoſition, that our Government will ſuffer themſelves to be diverted from this neceſſary attention to the welfare and ſafety of the country by the arrogant pretenſions of the French; or that the people of England will be ſo ſunk in ſpirit, ſo loſt to all ſenſe of their own dignity and intereſt, as to ſanction, by a baſe acquieſcence, the aſſertion of a right, on the part of their enemy, to give laws to Europe. What was the language holden to the Court of Vienna by the Directory of France, when negotiations for peace were opened by their reſpective Plenipotentiaries? It was this: "Our arms have been "ſucceſsful in every quarter, we have ſtripped "you of a part of your dominions, and you have "not taken one inch of territory from us: we, "therefore, ſhall aſſert the right of conqueſt, and, "regardleſs of any treaties which you may have "concluded with your ally for the purpoſe of "ſecuring the integrity of your poſſeſſions, ſhall "retain ſuch portions of the conquered countries "as will indemnify us for the expences of the war, "and enable us to extend our commerce, and "ſecure us hereafter from the danger of invaſion." On this principle the preliminary treaty,

all

all the articles of which are not yet known, was founded.

Now we ſtand, in reſpect of conqueſts, preciſely in the ſame ſituation relatively to France, as France then ſtood relatively to the Emperor. The inference is obvious. We are undoubtedly entirled, according to their own principles, putting the juſtice of our cauſe entirely out of the queſtion, to hold the ſame language to her as ſhe then held to our ally. Indeed, this was ſo palpable, that all the beſt periodical writers at Paris immediately ſuggeſted the idea, and declared that they did not ſee how the Directory could refuſe to adopt with England the ſame baſis of negotiation which they had themſelves propoſed to the Empire. In this caſe, then, thoſe pretenſions which a proper regard for our own ſecurity muſt lead us to urge, are evidently ſupported by a right the validity of which has been acknowledged by the French themſelves.

The plea advanced by the French Government to enforce the neceſſity of recovering all their own Colonies—one of which, by the bye, (Tobago,) it ſhould be remembered, was ceded by us as the *pretium pacis*, at the cloſe of the laſt war,—is that they are annexed to the Republic by a conſtitutional law, and cannot *therefore* be given up. But, we know from one of their own members, that there is a remedy for this difficulty, for M. DE LA CROIX admitted to Lord MALMESBURY, during the negotiation at Paris, that the Auſtrian Netherlands, which had been annexed in the ſame manner,

might be detached from the Republic by a convocation of the Primary Aſſemblies [34]. Now as the Directory had foreſeen ſome months ago the probability that a ceſſion of ſome of her colonial poſſeſſions would be required by England, if they had been ſincerely deſirous of putting a ſtop to the calamities of war, they had an opportunity of ſubmitting the queſtion to the Primary Aſſemblies when they were convened at the laſt election, "without plunging the nation," to uſe M. DE LA CROIX's expreſſion, "into all the confuſion which "muſt follow a convocation" of them, for an extraordinary purpoſe.

As to the ſettlements which we have taken from the allies of France, the reaſon advanced to ſanction the demand of their reſtitution is ſtill more futile, prepoſterous, and abſurd. To ſay that they muſt be reſtored becauſe the French have guaranteed the poſſeſſion of them to their former proprietors, is to ſay that the fiat of the Republic bears the ſtamp of omnipotence. If the French or their allies had any thing to reſtore to England, the caſe would be different; but they have nothing, the conqueſts are all on our ſide; the ceſſion, therefore, muſt be all on theirs. Beſides this obſtinate determination to inſiſt on the reſtitution of ſettlements which they had not the ability to defend, and have not the ability to retake, is a novel improvement on the paſt arrogance and preſumption of the French Government; for no

[34] See P. 53. of the Official Correſpondence.

longer

longer ſince than the month of December laſt, their Miniſter for Foreign Affairs "was ready to con-" feſs, that, from the great loſſes the Dutch Re-" public had ſuſtained in its colonies, and parti-" cularly from the weak manner in which they had " defended them, *it could not be expected* that his " Majeſty would conſent to a full and complete " reſtitution of them, and that it was reaſonable " that ſome ſhould be ſacrificed[35]."

No inſurmountable obſtacle, therefore, ſubſiſts to a ſucceſsful termination of the preſent negotiation. All the obſtructions that occur muſt be voluntarily raiſed by the French Directory, and muſt originate in a ſettled averſion from peace. If we conſent to reſtore all that we have taken from France, and to ſanction her retention of the Spaniſh part of St. Domingo, on which ſhe will no doubt inſiſt, *becauſe* ſhe obtained it in *expreſs violation of a treaty* (the treaty of Utrecht)—the extent of her power will be almoſt incalculable; and we ought certainly, in that caſe, to retain all the ſettlements which we have conquered from the Dutch; becauſe whatever is reſtored to them will tend to augment the ſtrength of France, who may be conſidered as the proprietor of Holland; ſince the poſſeſſion of Dutch Flanders, Maeſtricht, Venloo, and their dependencies, which are ſecured to her by treaty, and her right of keeping at all times a French garriſon in the port of Fluſhing, will enable her to become miſtreſs of the whole country, whenever intereſt or ambition may lead her to annex it, by *a conſtitutional decree*, to her

[35] P. 58. of the Official Correſpondence.

own territory. Even this acquiſition would form but an inadequate counterpoiſe to the gigantic power of France; unleſs the balance ſhould be reſtored by ſome regulations on the Continent of Europe, which the EMPEROR of RUSSIA is the only Potentate that is now competent to enforce. And this critical juncture affords that prince a glorious opportunity of deſerving the gratitude of the preſent age, and the thanks of poſterity.

If the French colonies were to be reſtored without an adequate conſideration, what infinite ſtrength would the arguments of Mr. BURKE acquire, on the conduct of the war? One of the principal reaſons urged in oppoſition to this opinion, that the troops which were ſent to the Weſt Indies would have ſerved the cauſe more effectually, if they had been ſent to ſupport the Royaliſts in Brittany, was, that Great Britain, by directing her force againſt the colonial ſettlements of her enemy, would acquire poſſeſſions, by means of which ſhe might, at a peace, ſecure the reſtitution of any territories that ſhould be taken from her Continental Allies. But now that we are left without an ally, and have no reſtitution to demand, unleſs we are to reap advantage, in ſome other way, from our conqueſts, all the blood and treaſure that have been conſumed in acquiring them will be literally thrown away; while, had the ſame efforts been made in Brittany, it is more than probable,—indeed *certain*, if General DANICAN's account may be credited—that a counter-revolution would have been produced in France, the danger ariſing from the diffuſion of democratic principles averted, and the French confined within their own limits.

But

But there cannot be a doubt that Miniſters will conſult the true intereſts and ſafety of the country, by inſiſting on a proper return for the reſtoration of the French colonies. They are too ſenſible of their importance to give them up on any other condition. During the laſt negotiation they conſidered them as an ample equivalent, in point of value, for the Netherlands, which, in order to preſerve the balance of power in Europe, they very properly called upon the French to reſtore to the Emperor; and therefore they will not, I ſhould hope, regard them as too dearly purchaſed, by the ceſſion of the Dutch colonies. As to the Cape of Good Hope, Mr. DUNDAS expreſſed himſelf ſo deciſively on that ſubject, in the debate on India affairs, towards the concluſion of the laſt year[36], that, ſituated as we now

[36] Mr. DUNDAS's expreſſion was, "That with reſpect to the "Cape of Good Hope, his opinion concerning the poſſeſſion "of that ſettlement was as different from that of an Honour-"able Baronet, (Sir FRANCIS BARING,) as light from dark-"neſs." The opinion of Sir FRANCIS BARING, from which Mr. DUNDAS here expreſſed his total diſſent, was, that the Cape of Good Hope "was an object of no moment in the ne-"gotiation then carrying on." Of courſe, Mr. DUNDAS was of opinion that it was an object of very great importance to the commercial intereſt of this country; and as no man in the kingdom underſtands that intereſt better, or is more converſant with every thing that relates to the proſperity and ſecurity of our eaſtern territories, there can be no doubt that his voice will be ſucceſsfully exerted in the Cabinet to procure ſuch terms from the enemy as will be perfectly compatible with thoſe important, thoſe eſſential objects.

The opinion of Mr. DUNDAS on this ſubject was fully confirmed by that of a gentleman of the firſt conſideration in the mercantile world, Mr. DAVID SCOTT, who declared, that "The Cape of Good Hope and the Iſland of Ceylon were of "the greateſt importance, next to the poſſeſſion of Bengal, for "ſecuring the empire of the Eaſt." See *Woodfall's Parliamentary Reports* for 1796, vol. i. p. 522, 525.

are, its attention muſt, I conceive, be deemed a ſettled point; and having more than an ample equivalent to offer for the remaining colonies of that Republic, we have an indiſputable right to retain them.

There is little to be ſaid on the demand of the French Government for the reſtitution of the ſhips taken at Toulon: they certainly are not, of themſelves, an object of ſufficient importance to be put, for a moment, in competition with the advantages to be derived from the reſtoration of tranquillity. But it appears to me, that their reſtitution has been demanded on falſe grounds; and that an unfair mode of argument has been adopted, in order to juſtify a compliance with the demand. It has been contended, that we had made a poſitive and unqualified ſtipulation to reſtore thoſe ſhips, whenever peace ſhould take place; and in order to ſupport this poſition, a *partial* quotation of Lord HOOD's Preliminary Declaration to the People of Toulon, on the 23d of Auguſt 1793, has been adduced. It cannot be denied, that the latter part of that Declaration, taken by itſelf, is deciſive of the queſtion; but it cannot, with any regard to propriety, be ſo taken: and if the whole be conſidered, it will, I think, be allowed, that the reſtitution was only intended to take place in the event of Monarchy being reſtored in France. In fact, who were the perſons that entered into the treaty with the Combined Powers?—the ROYALISTS: and it is notorious, that the city of Toulon was forcibly taken from them; that the greater part of them were inhumanly maſſacred in cold blood; and that,

at this moment, none of the parties to the treaty remain to call for that reſtitution, which, in my apprehenſion, they alone, according to a fair conſtruction of the treaty, and a due conſideration of all the events by which it was preceded and followed, are entitled to call for. The following is the whole of the Declaration in queſtion:

" *If a candid and explicit declaration in favour* " *of Monarchy is made* at Toulon and Marſeilles, " and the ſtandard of Royalty hoiſted, the ſhips in " the harbour diſmantled, and the port and forts " proviſionally at my diſpoſition, ſo as to allow of " egreſs and regreſs with ſafety, the people of Pro- " vence ſhall have all the aſſiſtance and ſupport " which his Britannic Majeſty's fleet under my " command can give; and not an atom of private " property of any individual ſhall be touched, but " protected; having no other view than that of " reſtoring peace to a great nation upon juſt, libe- " ral, and honourable terms:—*this muſt be the* " *ground-work of the Treaty.*

" And whenever peace takes place, which I " hope and truſt will be ſoon, the port, with all " the ſhips in the harbour, and forts of Toulon, " ſhall be reſtored to France, with the ſtores of " every kind, agreeable to the ſchedule that may " be delivered."

The ground-work of this Treaty then, as far as I can underſtand it, was the reſtoration of Monarchy in France. Had that event taken place, no queſtion would have ariſen upon the ſubject; but the city voluntarily ſurrendered having been forcibly recovered, and an attempt made to retake thoſe very

ſhips in the harbour, from that moment the Treaty (until the reſtoration of Monarchy at leaſt) ceaſed to have effect, and the veſſels became lawful prizes.

There is one melancholy reflection that muſt naturally ariſe in the mind of every man who has the welfare and intereſt of his country at heart, on contemplating the preſent ſtate of political parties. If Miniſters were now to conclude a Treaty with France, upon terms that confirmed the extenſion of her power, and gave a ſanction to her principles; upon terms the moſt derogatory to the honour, and the moſt incompatible with the proſperity and ſafety of the kingdom, the Members and Supporters of Oppoſition would not dare to arraign them for their conduct. That "the ſalvation of the coun-"try depends upon immediate peace," is the language which they have uniformly holden. No ſacrifice, therefore, which Miniſters ſhould make to obtain it could poſſibly incur *their* cenſure. Thus, by their eagerneſs to thwart the operations of Government, have they deprived themſelves of all opportunity of becoming the champions of their country, the defenders of her intereſt, or the guardians of her honour, at a period ſo critical and important, that nothing leſs than her political exiſtence depends on the wiſdom of her councils, and the energy of her deciſions. Such are the dreadful effects of a ſpirit of party, founded on a violation of all ſound principles, and purſued in open contempt of all that Engliſhmen have hitherto been accuſtomed to regard as true patriotiſm. *One Peer*, indeed, has *ſpecially* reſerved to himſelf the right

of

of diſplaying the true ſpirit of a Briton on ſuch an occaſion; and there are, no doubt, ſome few Members of either Houſe, who would ſtand forward in ſupport of his arguments. But there would be no regular force, no united body, no party, in ſhort, to riſe in defence of the forſaken country. The Preſs too, ſo far as relates to periodical publications, which have the moſt general influence on the public mind, would be equally paſſive, if not worſe than paſſive; for, ſtrange as it may appear, it is indiſputably true, that it is as much ſhackled and reſtrained by the ſpirit of party as it could be by the moſt reſtrictive laws! Fortunately we are warranted, from the paſt declarations and conduct, as well as by the known diſpoſition and characters of the Britiſh Miniſters, to believe that the country will never be placed in ſo perilous a ſituation.

At all events, it becomes the Nation to manifeſt that ſpirit which ſhall convince our enemy that we are reſolved to encounter every difficulty which can reſult from a continuation of the war, rather than purchaſe peace by a baſe dereliction of thoſe principles which our anceſtors ever held ſacred. A writer, whom I have had frequent occaſion to quote, and whoſe predictions, unfortunately for Europe, have hitherto been too fatally verified, thus deſcribes the diſpoſition and intentions of France towards this country: "The Emperor, "reduced by force to the neceſſity of abandoning "his only Ally, the Directory will turn all their "thunder againſt England. On that Conſtitution "which acts as an inceſſant ſatire on the democratic

" extravagances of the French Conventions—on " the King of a *free* Nation—on a State more " rich, more induſtrious, more flouriſhing, than " modern France—on that receptacle of ſo many " treaſures—on that power whoſe weight ſtill ſeems " to balaſt the Continent—they have reſolved to " inflict a fatal blow. It is abſurd to ſuppoſe, that " the deſire of recovering a few colonies will ever " inſpire the French Government with an idea of " peace. They have devoted the Antilles to de- " ſolation—they have covered them with a crowd " of deſperate banditti—they are leſs anxious to " regain what they have loſt, than to reduce the " whole of that Archipelago to aſhes [37]." Again— " The Republic wiſhes to remain at war with " Great Britain, iſolated, and abandoned by the " Continent [38]." Should this really prove to be the caſe, the war will then indeed become what the French Republicans, at the commencement of the conteſt, ſo frequently ſtated it to be, *Bellum internecinum*. The only mode of convincing our enemies of the folly of ſuch conduct, is by ſhewing them that we have ſufficient unanimity among ourſelves, and ſufficient reſources to render all their ſenſeleſs projects abortive. As the commercial world would be peculiarly affected by a diſadvantageous peace, it behoves them to ſet an example of public ſpirit, and to make an offer, in which they would doubtleſs be joined by all the opulent part of the community, to furniſh the requiſite ſupplies for another campaign, in a way that would

[37] Letter to a Miniſter of State, p. 30.

[38] Id. p. 31.

effectually

effectually prevent any depreſſion of the funds, in caſe the French ſhould not accede to fair and equitable terms. Such an offer, made at this critical period, would have the moſt beneficial effect on public affairs. It would revive the drooping ſpirit of the nation, ſtrike the enemy with diſmay, and accelerate the concluſion of a Treaty on ſafe and honourable grounds.

Supplies indeed might ſtill be raiſed in the uſual way, but only on terms highly diſadvantageous to the public; and recourſe cannot then be had to an open loan, *ſimilar to the laſt*, after what has paſſed on that ſubject in the Houſe of Commons. As much miſrepreſentation has taken place on the ſubject of that loan, and as the public in general are but little acquainted with the true grounds of the application made to Parliament, during the laſt Seſſions, for ſome relief to the ſubſcribers, and as it is eſſential, as well from juſtice to the individuals concerned in the tranſaction, as from national conſiderations of great importance, that the matter ſhould be rightly underſtood, I ſhall briefly ſtate the whole buſineſs in its true colours.

When the Chancellor of the Exchequer found it expedient to adopt the mode of raiſing the ſupplies for the year by means of a voluntary loan, inſtead of having recourſe to the uſual mode, he ſent for a number of Bankers and other mercantile men, who were in the habit of advancing money on ſuch occaſions, to whom he communicated his intention of raiſing the ſum of FIFTEEN MILLIONS, *which would be all that he ſhould want to raiſe by loan until after the* 31*ſt of October* 1797, *the day on which*

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When the Chancellor of the Exchequer found it expedient to adopt the mode of raiſing the ſupplies for the year by means of a voluntary loan, inſtead of having recourſe to the uſual mode, he ſent for a number of Bankers and other mercantile men, who were in the habit of advancing money on ſuch occaſions, to whom he communicated his intention of raiſing the ſum of FIFTEEN MILLIONS, *which would be all that he ſhould want to raiſe by loan until after the* 31*ſt of October* 1797, *the day on which*

which it was propoſed that the laſt payment upon the intended voluntary loan ſhould be made. After that time, it was probable that he might have occaſion to iſſue Exchequer Bills to the amount of Four or Five Millions. He farther ſtated, that the proof of public ſpirit which a loan advanced in the way which he had ſuggeſted would ſupply, would certainly be productive of great advantage to the State. After this interview the Chancellor of the Exchequer, having revolved the matter in his own mind, determined to extend the ſum to EIGHTEEN MILLIONS, which he conceived would be adequate to defray ALL the expences of the year.

It may be aſked, in *what* the proof of PUBLIC SPIRIT conſiſted in this tranſaction? The anſwer is obvious. The ſubſcribers conſented to advance their money to Government on terms highly advantageous to the State, and highly diſadvantageous to themſelves. They were to pay 100 *l.* in money for 112 *l.* 10 *s.* ſtock, which ſtock, at the price which it then bore, would only produce 97 *l.* 10 *s.*; ſo that they ſubmitted to an immediate and certain loſs of 2½ *per cent.* which, on the Eighteen Millions, amounted to 450,000 *l.* To this loſs, at a time too when money might be employed moſt beneficially to the poſſeſſor, and to any other loſs which a difference of ſtock, produced by the common courſe of events, might occaſion, the ſubſcribers voluntarily ſubjected themſelves; and in ſo doing they unqueſtionably diſplayed a ſignal proof of public ſpirit. But they did not ſubject themſelves to any farther loſs; for they advanced their money in conſequence of, and in a firm reliance upon,

Mr.

Mr. PITT's declaration, that *he ſhould not have occaſion to raiſe any more money, by way of loan, for the ſervice of the year.* If they had been told that, after a ſhort interval, another loan would be neceſſary, they certainly, at leaſt a greater part of them, would not have advanced their money on the terms propoſed, becauſe they would have known that they muſt naturally ſuſtain a much greater loſs than that which they had made up their minds to ſuſtain.

Contrary to Mr. PITT's expectations, the preſſure of public affairs, in a very ſhort ſpace of time, rendered another loan, and to a very large amount, unavoidable. It was accordingly raiſed, and on terms which ſufficiently proved how much indebted the nation was to the liberality of the ſubſcribers to the voluntary loan. The conſequence of this tranſaction is well known; the market became overſtocked with ſcrip; the firſt loan immediately experienced a conſiderable depreciation; and the loſs of the ſubſcribers was now increaſed from 2½ to 15 *per cent.* or from 450,000 *l.* to 2,700,000 *l.*! And this enormous additional loſs was occaſioned ſolely and excluſively by the circumſtance of Mr. PITT being reduced to the neceſſity of acting contrary to that declaration, upon the faith of which the ſubſcribers had advanced their money. The difference in value between the two loans has been as much as *twenty-ſix per cent.*; which difference is, of itſelf, ſufficient to ſhew what eſſential obligations the nation are under to the perſons who ſubſcribed to the firſt loan.

Under theſe circumſtances it muſt, I think, appear to every impartial and upright mind, that the application

application to Parliament for relief from a loſs produced in ſuch a way, muſt be conſidered not as a claim for *indulgence*, but as a demand for *juſtice*; and nothing can be ſo clear as that to ſtigmatiſe men who advanced their money on the terms which I have deſcribed, as mercenary jobbers and intereſted ſpeculators, is to advance a calumny as foul and as groſs as ever fell from the lips of a detracter. It may very well ſuit the purpoſe of Mr. SHERIDAN to render every thing connected with *Loyalty* the butt of ridicule, or the ſubject of reprobation; but the ſubſcribers to the loan cannot be much affected either by the wit or the abuſe of a man who has ſtood forward as the aſſailant of Mr. REEVES, and the encomiaſt of Meſſrs. MUIR and PALMER. To ſelect the Father of the Loyal Aſſociations, the end of which was to defend the Conſtitution againſt the attacks of its enemies, foreign and domeſtic, as the object of proſecution, and felons who had been convicted of ſeditious practices, the tendency of which was to deſtroy the Conſtitution, as the objects of panegyric, betrayed a mind ſo framed, that its cenſure muſt confer diſtinction, and its praiſe alone be regarded as a theme for regret! They are minds of this ſtamp that have uniformly, during the war, gloried in the ſucceſs of the French, and triumphed in the defeat of their enemies.

Νῦν δὲ τὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν κακα γίγνεσθαι ἐσθλὰ κακοῖσιν
Ανδρῶν, γίγνονται δ' ευτραπέλοισι νόμος.

It is worthy of remark, too, that the application in queſtion was founded upon no novel principle, but

but was fully authoriſed by a very recent example. It muſt be freſh in the recollection of every member, that Mr. Boyd, at the cloſe of the year 1795, claimed an indemnity for a loſs which he was likely to ſuſtain on account of a ſecond loan being neceſſary before the payments on the preceding loan, which had been filled by himſelf and his friends, would be completed. The juſtice of this plea was admitted by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and confirmed, after much deliberation, by the Houſe, although it appeared, in the courſe of debate, "*that the greater part of the firſt loan had been ſold for a high premium:*" The indemnity which Mr. Boyd claimed and received was a preference in reſpect of the new loan, which he accordingly advanced, on terms which were deemed advantageous to the public. Thoſe terms were, for every 100 *l.*, 104 *l.* 5 *s.* 3 *d.*; ſo that the ſubſcribers to the voluntary loan advanced their money to the public at the rate of 6 *l.* 15 *s.* 3 *d. per cent.* leſs than Mr. Boyd, whoſe terms were allowed to be advantageous to the nation; and this made a difference, upon the Eighteen Millions, in favour of the public, of 1,217,500 *l.*!—And if the greater ſcarcity of money at the period when the laſt of theſe loans was advanced be taken into conſideration, the difference will be found to be infinitely greater. Hence it is evident that the ſubſcribers to the voluntary loan have a much greater claim upon Parliament than Mr. Boyd had, whoſe claim was admitted: *indulgence* they wiſh not, but *juſtice* they are entitled to expect; and it becomes the Houſe moſt ſeriouſly to conſider

ſider the conſequences that may reſult, not only from a refuſal, but even from a heſitation, to comply with a demand of this nature. To give a check to public ſpirit is at all times impolitic, but, at a period like the preſent, to diſguſt the beſt friends of the country, is to commit an act of ſuicide!

One argument was produced in the debate on this buſineſs which ought not to paſs without notice: it was contended by Mr. SHERIDAN, who was not likely to be affected by the deciſion, and by ſome other gentlemen in Oppoſition, that a member who was perſonally intereſted in the tranſaction, by being a ſubſcriber to the loan, had no right to give a vote on the queſtion. Of the juſtneſs of this principle, as applicable to every other body of men than the *Repreſentatives of the People*, every one muſt be convinced; but how far the Houſe of Commons is authoriſed to deprive the people of the advice and aſſiſtance of any one of their *Repreſentatives*, on a matter of public concern, is a queſtion not ſo eaſy of deciſion. Without, however, entering upon a diſcuſſion which could not, for obvious reaſons, be purſued without danger, let me aſk whether this principle, which, in the preſent inſtance, was evidently advanced to ſerve the purpoſes of party, be generally obſerved by the Houſe of Commons? I believe no one Member will feel diſpoſed to anſwer in the affirmative. If my memory fail me not, inſtances may be adduced in which Mr. SHERIDAN himſelf has acted in open violation of it. I think it was towards the cloſe of Lord NORTH's adminiſtration,

that

that a tax was ſuggeſted on places of public amuſement, when the *Member for Stafford* declared his reſolution to oppoſe it, *becauſe* it would be injurious to his intereſt, as a *proprietor of Drury-Lane Theatre* [39]. Another Member of Oppoſition, being recently applied to on the ſubject of a canal bill about to be brought into the Houſe, which it was ſtated would be productive of great injury to a nobleman in the neighbourhood, obſerved, that his perſonal intereſt was ſo deeply involved in the ſucceſs of the bill, that he ſhould certainly give it all the ſupport in his power. Indeed, it is notorious, that in the caſe of turnpike and canal bills, which, be it obſerved, are to all intents and purpoſes *public bills*, the Members who are moſt intereſted not only bring them into the Houſe, but watch their progreſs with the moſt active ſolicitude, vote upon every queſtion to which they give riſe, preſide at the committees [40], act the part of advocates, and even make as regular a canvas

[39] My recollection of this tranſaction is very imperfect, and I ſhould be truly ſorry to commit any error in my ſtatement. But, I believe, that Mr. SHERIDAN obſerved, that the propoſed tax, which was to have been ſixpence on every Box-ticket, would prevent a number of perſons from frequenting the Theatre. Whether he has found this to be the caſe ſince he has, by his own authority, impoſed a tax of one ſhilling on the admiſſion to the boxes, I cannot pretend to ſay.

[40] It were to be wiſhed that Committees of this deſcription were ſubject to the ſame regulations as the Committees for trying conteſted elections; for caſes not unfrequently occur in which public good is oppoſed, and, I am ſorry to ſay, unſucceſsfully oppoſed, to private intereſt. In the caſe of a canal bill, it is rather extraordinary that a man who holds a ſingle ſhare in the canal is thereby incapacitated from being heard as a witneſs, while a Member who holds a hundred ſhares is allowed to ſit as a Judge.

for

for ſupporters as for votes at a general election. I do not mean to juſtify this conduct, but merely to contend, that it ill becomes the men who violate the principle in one inſtance, to enforce it in another; and, that if the principle be juſt in itſelf, and be *ever* applied, it ought *always* to be applied.

As this, Sir, is probably, the laſt time that I ſhall have occaſion to addreſs you, I think it neceſſary to repel a charge which has been preferred againſt me, on the ſubject of my former letter. I have been publicly accuſed of treating you not only with acrimony and violence, but even with *malignity*, which implies a diſpoſition of mind to which, thank Heaven! I am a total ſtranger. If I did not clearly eſtabliſh the difference between your private and profeſſional, and your political character, I certainly expreſſed my ſentiments but very imperfectly. While I condemn the errors of the politician, I admire the talents of the advocate, I reſpect the virtues of the man. It is, indeed, the reſpect which I entertain for your perſonal virtues that increaſes my ſolicitude to expoſe your political errors. For I am truly concerned to ſee a man of reſpectable character become the advocate of a deſperate faction. All the evils which have deſolated France, and which threaten to ſpread their baleful influence over Europe, are imputable to a ſimilar conduct purſued by men of the ſame ſtamp, at the commencement of the revolution. It was the *moderate* party, it was that deſcription of perſons who were friends to a rational reform, and who, from the *urbanity*, *candour*, and

moderation,

moderation, which they diſplayed in their arguments, not leſs than from the excellence of their private characters, and the real or ſuppoſed goodneſs of their intentions, gained a conſiderable aſcendancy over the half-reformed and well-meaning part of the community, that paved the way for the deſtruction of the ancient monarchy of France. By imperceptible degrees, they poiſoned the minds of the people, taught them to ſhake off that reſpect, bordering on veneration, with which they had been uſed to regard the inſtitutions of their anceſtors, accuſtomed them to view the progreſs of innovation with a fearleſs eye, ſerved, without intending it, the cauſe of the Jacobins, and, in ſeeking to awaken the embers of reform, fanned the flame of revolt. Had the Jacobins themſelves ſtood forward, in the firſt inſtance, and diſplayed all their hideous deformity, all their ferocious violence, to the naked ſight of the public, before their minds had been thus prepared for the reception of their doctrine, the people would have been ſtricken with horror at their attempts, and all their efforts to demoliſh a fabric which had withſtood the ſhocks of fourteen centuries, would have proved fruitleſs and abortive. Should the enemies of England ever ſucceed in ſubverting the conſtitution of the country,—*Dii talem avertite peſtem!*—they muſt be indebted for their ſucceſs to the previous exertions of virtuous but miſtaken men, who, aiming at improvement, facilitate demolition.

If, in the expoſure of your errors, I have uſed ſtrong language, I can ſupport my conduct by

authorities which thoſe who cenſure it moſt will be leaſt diſpoſed to reject. A noble author, to whoſe opinions I am not accuſtomed to pay much reſpect, but who began this controverſy, at the concluſion of his Letters to his conſtituents, expreſsly ſays, "If my language has been ſtrong, it appears to me to ſuit the nature of the times." Mr. Fox himſelf has made a ſimilar declaration in the courſe of debate; and whoever will read with attention the ſpeeches of Mr. SHERIDAN, ſince the commencement of the war, will be compelled to acknowledge that no language which I have uſed is to be compared, in point of violence, with his. Indeed, I can ſcarcely conceive it poſſible not to expreſs ſtrongly that which is ſtrongly felt; but, on recurring to my Letter, I apprehend, you will find that the ſtrongeſt paſſages which it contains are extracted from the ſpeeches of Mr. Fox and yourſelf.

Some parts of that production which have, I know, given conſiderable offence, though prudence forbids the confeſſion, I am enabled to juſtify by your own principles. In a recent addreſs, conveyed in language the moſt nervous and impreſſive, enforced with reaſons the moſt cogent and convincing, marked by ſentiments the moſt honourable to the heart that conceived them, and breathing a ſpirit of chriſtianity the moſt pure and upright, you proclaimed the influence of religion and morality on the government of a ſtate. You juſtly remarked, that "public freedom is beſt ſecured "by the morals of a nation;" and moſt truly aſſerted,

aſſerted, that "the religious and moral ſenſe of the "people of Great Britain is the great anchor which "alone can hold the veſſel of the ſtate amidſt "the ſtorms which agitate the world." Acceding, as I do, moſt cordially, to the ſoundneſs of this doctrine, am I to be cenſured for deprecating the appointment of men, who live in open violation of all the ties of religion and morality, to places of high truſt in the ſtate*? If not only the preſervation of public freedom, but the political ſalvation of the ſtate depends on the religious and moral ſenſe of the people, is not he the beſt friend of his country who ſeeks to exclude from her government the irreligious and the immoral, however faſcinating their eloquence, however ſplendid their talents?

"Velocius et citiùs nos
"Corrumpunt vitiorum exempla domeſtica, *magnis*
"Cum ſubeunt animis *auctoribus*."

On this point, Sir, if you remain true to your own principles, and I am convinced that you are incapable of departing from them, we muſt agree; admit my premiſes, and you cannot impeach the juſtice of my concluſions. However widely we may differ on political topics, on all queſtions of

* On this point I have the further ſupport of an authority to which many of your political aſſociates will incline to pay greater reſpect than yourſelf.—"GOOD MEN, NOT GOOD "LAWES, MUST SAVE KINGDOMES."—"PUT RIGHTEOUS "MEN INTO PLACES OF TRUST."—This was the language of no leſs a man than HUGH PETERS; as you may ſee by referring to a tract of his intitled, "*A Word for the Armie, and* "*two Words for the Kingdome.*" Printed in 1647.

morality our ſentiments, I truſt, will ever be found to correſpond.

Now that I am on the ſubject of exculpation, I ſhall take leave to advert to one other accuſation which has been alleged againſt me, with an equal regard to truth, and urged with an equal degree of candour. It has been inſinuated, in terms too plain to be miſtaken, that I am an *agent* of adminiſtration, and have been *employed* by Government to write in defence of their meaſures. This idea has been propagated with a view to diſcredit my writings, and to impeach the ſincerity of my principles. I ſhould be fully juſtified, indeed, in treating ſuch a charge with ſilent contempt. Admitting it to be true, it could not poſſibly affect the ſtrength of my arguments or the validity of my proofs. The attention of critics ſhould be limited to the contents of a book; whenever they go beyond that point, they travel out of the record, they tranſgreſs the bounds of their duty, and ſubject themſelves to cenſure for impertinence. But as the charge is intended to impreſs the prepoſterous idea, that no man can ſupport the government of the country on *principle*; as in the preſent times the influence of prejudice is peculiarly ſtrong; and as the moſt inceſſant efforts are made to increaſe it, by *certain ſectaries who have nine-tenths of the periodical publications of the day in their hands or under their control*; I deem it expedient to repel it, by a ſolemn and unequivocal declaration, that no one perſon connected with miniſters has had the ſmalleſt concern with any political pamphlet that I ever have compoſed; that I have written them all

ſpontaneouſly

ſpontaneouſly without any communication with others; that no part of the expence attending the publication of them has been borne by Government; that I never have received, directly or indirectly, any conſideration or recompence for having publiſhed them, except a fair diviſion of the profits ariſing from their ſale; that I was not led to compoſe them from the hope of emolument or the proſpect of reward, but ſolely and excluſively from a conſcientious and diſintereſted deſire to ſerve the cauſe, which I had eſpouſed from *principle*, and from a conviction of its tendency to promote the welfare and happineſs of my country. That there are minds which can only be ſtimulated to exertion by the ſpur of intereſt, I can eaſily conceive; and it is perfectly natural that ſuch minds ſhould judge of others by themſelves

Extraordinary, Sir, as it may appear to you, it is with extreme repugnance that I have been induced to ſay ſo much of ſo inſignificant an individual as myſelf; but my duty to the public ſeemed to me to require it. Though it ſeems that I have ſubjected myſelf to the imputation of *egotiſm*, from the adoption, I ſuppoſe, of the epiſtolary ſtyle, which renders a frequent uſe of the firſt perſon unavoidable, it is, in fact, a fault or a foible, whichever it may be called, that I utterly deſpiſe. I ſhall now, Sir, take my leave of you with the expreſſion of an earneſt hope, that cool reflection will lead to a retractation of your errors, and that you will ſuffer the virtues of the moraliſt to correct the vices of the politician.

A WORD TO THE CRITICS.

I WILL not addreſs *you* in the ſtyle in which a facetious bard once addreſſed a convocation of ſerious and learned men in one of our Univerſities,—I will not, like him, ſay—" Vos Doctores ſine doctrinâ, " vos Magiſtri artium ſine artibus, vos Bachelorii " baculo potius quam lauro digni."—I will rather adopt the ſtyle of the courteous Moor, as being better adapted to the high office which you hold in the court of literature:—" Moſt potent, grave, " and reverend Signiors,"

It has, of late, become a practice with the bookſellers, whenever they wiſh to promote the circulation of a work, to extract from your critical labours, ſuch paſſages as, in their apprehenſion, contain ſentiments favourable to the author, and either to ſubjoin them to the advertiſement which announces the publication to the world, or to prefix them to the book itſelf. To me, I confeſs, it appears that this cuſtom, however it may be found to anſwer the purpoſe of the bookſeller, is very unfair in reſpect of the public, as it exhibits to their view nothing more than an *ex-parte* evidence, by which *their* deciſion ought certainly never to be regulated. In order to obviate any objection that might reaſonably be

ſtarted

ſtarted to this unfair mode of proceeding, and to enable my readers to profit by the admirable talents, the nice diſcriminative powers, the vaſt political knowledge, and the wonderful critical acumen which you have diſplayed in your maſterly analyſis of my unfortunate work, I ſhall totally ſink the praiſes which one of your brethren has raſhly beſtowed on it, and preſent them only with ſuch of your comments as tend to conſign it to everlaſting infamy. Seniores Priores—I ſhall begin with

The MONTHLY REVIEW (for July 1797).

" 'Affectation and hypocriſy,' ſays Mr. G. (p. " 170) 'which the refinement of modern philoſo- " phy has dignified with the equivocal appellation " of *liberality* and *moderation*, are not the weapons " of TRUTH.' Under the influence of this principle, " in its utmoſt latitude, the preſent publication " appears to have been written. It is VIOLENT[40], " ſcurrilous, and abuſive; yet WITHOUT FORCE, ſa- " tire, or humour. It concludes with this paragraph: " 'A firm determination to ſuffer no impoſition to " be practiſed upon the public, in a point of ſuch " extreme importance to the nation, and a wiſh " to diſplay the conduct of your party in a proper " point of view, led me to ſubmit, in a ſtate of " health but ill-calculated for mental exertion of any " kind, to the trouble of peruſing your tract and

[40] "Violence, *force*; violent, *forcible*, acting with ſtrength." Johnſon.—To be *forcible without force* is a talent which I was not conſcious of poſſeſſing; thank ye, ſapient Critics, for the diſcovery!

" expoſing its defects. *To uſe your own language,* " —Theſe conſiderations induced me to travel " through one of the moſt dull, deſpicable, and " miſerable performances that ever I had been " doomed to read."

And this is called criticiſm!!! God help the poor nation whoſe literary taſte is to be directed by ſuch critics as theſe. I was once ſo unfortunate as to incur the commendation of theſe gentlemen, and, ſtrange as it may appear, for a political tract written on the very ſame ſubject as that which is here ſo unmercifully treated, containing arguments founded on the very ſame data, enforcing the very ſame principles, and having the very ſame object and end!—But,

Quid refert dictis ignoſcat Mucius, an non?

I cannot be very anxious to court the praiſe, or to avert the cenſure of men, who can claſs the author of the book " on Political Juſtice" and of " The Enquirer," whoſe object appears to be to reverſe the admonition of Saint PAUL, and to render every man diſcontented with his lot, among " the *benevolent philoſophers* and *enlightened re-* " *formers*" of the age; and who can repreſent our public ſeminaries of education " as initiatory *ſchools* " *of vice**."

Next in order comes that mirror of political and critical wiſdom, manufactured by——but, huſh,

* See *Monthly Review* for July 1797,—pp. 293, 294.—One mode by which theſe Potent Signiors frequently ſhew their approbation or diſlike of a publication is by accelerating or retarding their review of it. Thus Mr. ERSKINE's Pamphlet appeared

hush, I will not diſcloſe " the ſecrets of the Priſon-
" houſe,"—ycleped

The CRITICAL REVIEW (for July 1797).

' After the ample diſcuſſion which the origin
' of the war had undergone—after the unconfuted
' arguments, and the ſtrong and unanſwerable
' *proofs* which had been adduced by a learned and
' worthy friend of mine, as well as by myſelf, in
' ſupport of its juſtice and neceſſity, I conceived
' the queſtion of aggreſſion to be finally decided.'
—P. 1.

" This worthy friend, JOHN BOWLES Eſq. and
" our Author, are a very pretty pair—*par nobile*
" *fratrum*, equally capable of deciding great po-
" litical queſtions. Our Author holds his anta-
" goniſt in the utmoſt contempt."

' Your whole narrative' (ſays he) ' of the
' proceedings previous to the declaration of war
' by France, exhibits a groſs ignorance of facts,
' a ſhameful perverſion of circumſtances, and a
' miſhapen heap of falſe concluſions, which mark
' the advocate of party, but diſgrace the friend of
' truth.'—P. 51.

——' the obſervations which are ſcattered over
' your Work, like the thiſtles on your native hills,

appeared in the middle of March; and, ON THE FIRST OF APRIL, with ominous precipitation, the Monthly Reviewers proclaimed him to be equal, in political wiſdom, to the *Sages* of Greece and Rome! Whereas my unfortunate Anſwer, which appeared in the following month, was not conſigned to infamy till the firſt of Auguſt!

' that

'that exhibit a ſpectacle of diſguſtful barrenneſs, 'deforming the ſoil they are unable to fertilize.'—P. 51.

'The contempt which the extreme puerility 'of your arguments extorts is loſt in ſurpriſe at 'the weakneſs of their baſis. But the foundation 'being deſtroyed, the ſuperſtructure falls of courſe, 'exhibiting, in its flimſy ruins, an object for the 'deriſion of ſenſe, the ſcorn of judgment, the 'deploration of vanity, and the lamentations of 'egotiſm.'—P. 55.

"Mr. ERSKINE will derive ſome ſmall conſolation "under theſe cenſures, *that* *John Locke, printed "in *Italics*, is termed 'that arch propagator of wild "conceits, that wholeſale fabricator of fanciful "ſyſtems of polity.' After ſuch ſpecimens of "our Author's ſtyle†, our readers will, we are per-"ſuaded, very gladly be *excuſed from* any further "extracts *out of* this monſtrous heap of egotiſm, "ſelf-conceit, and miſrepreſentation. We will not, "however, apply to this Work what our Author "does to that of his adverſary, that it is 'one of "the moſt dull, deſpicable, and miſerable per-"formances that ever we had been doomed to "read;' we will do him the juſtice to ſay, that we

* Your ſublime Critics cannot be expected to lower their underſtandings to a level with the vulgar rules of *grammar!*

† So that *ſtyle*, according to theſe Critics, is the only thing to be conſidered in a political tract. Yet to judge by the conſtruction of the ſentences in this curious Critique, in which not only ſtyle but grammar appears to be holden in utter contempt, one might be led to imagine, that it would be the only thing they would neglect to notice!

" have even read worſe—worſe not only in ſtyle " and compoſition, but even in ſpirit and intention."

I am very much obliged to the gentlemen, and am truly happy in my ability to return the compliment to their *Critique*; for I have peruſed their remarks on former productions of mine, as well as on others which they have been pleaſed to father on me. Indeed they have diſplayed a much greater degree of moderation and candour in this inſtance, than I had a right to expect after their paſt animadverſions, and after the appearance of the *note* in p. 136 of my Letter to the Earl of LAUDERDALE, which it is poſſible I may one day be tempted to enlarge.—*Verbum ſat.*

" Though laſt, not leaſt in fame," comes

The ANALYTICAL REVIEW (for May 1797).

" More than fifty pages of this pamphlet are " filled in an endeavour to ſhew the falſehood of " Mr. ERSKINE's reaſoning on the queſtion, Who " were the aggreſſors in the preſent war, the French " or the Engliſh? Mr. ERSKINE attempted to " prove the French were *not* the aggreſſors. Mr. " G. with much bitterneſs of ſarcaſm, and malig- " nity of reproach, urges the miniſterial *declama-* " *tion*, and quotes from many party writers, to " prove, that England has only acted on the de- " fenſive, and that France actually and reſolutely " planned, provoked, and began the conteſt *.

* The quotations by which I proved this fact, were not taken from *Party-Writers*, but chiefly from the written and verbal declarations of the French Republicans themſelves.

" In

" In addition to the reaſons *we* have alleged " againſt the ſuppoſition of French aggreſſion*, we " have to obſerve that, whoever began the war, " *it is clear* that we often rejected overtures for " peace†, not even for the *oſtenſible* reaſon " (it was never ſuggeſted at the time even by " Miniſters) that the French were not *ſincere* in " their *propoſitions of negotiation*, but becauſe they " were ſcornfully repreſented as incapable of main- " taining the accuſtomed relations of peace and " amity. Nay, ſo far were the nation from being " induced to countenance the war at firſt on ac- " count of any apprehenſion of French invaſion, " or the immediate attacks of the French either by " ſea or land, that the plea of our rulers, and the " fears of the people, went to the poſſibility, *if* " *they were ſuffered to eſtabliſh a free government*, " that they would, at ſome future time, aſſiſt in " deſtroying the monarchies of Europe. Upon " *every offer of negotiation*, upon every motion on " the ſubject in the Houſe of Commons, was it " not triumphantly aſked, With whom are we to " treat? We were of opinion, that Mr. ERSKINE " fully proved his point, as far as the matter of " aggreſſion came under review, and we continue " ſtill of the ſame opinion; nor can the repreſent- " ations of Mr. ERSKINE, and the clear recollec- " tion of our own minds, receive any refutation

* " See review of Mr. ERSKINE's Pamphlet, *Analytical* " *Review* for March, p. 308."

† I ſhould be glad to know *when*, *by whom*, and *to whom* theſe overtures for *peace* were made?

" from

" from *the garbled accounts*, the dogmatical *aſ-*
" *ſertions*, and the *ex-parte ſtatements* of Mr. G.
" Whatever the Combined Powers *publicly* declared
" is ſufficient evidence of their intention, to this
" *independent* writer; but whatever was pro-
" nounced, and with whatever ſolemnity accom-
" panied*, by the French, is rejected at once as
" falſe, deceitful, and perfidious. The various ob-
" jects of the war, at different times alleged by
" Mr. PITT, and his various and oppoſite mani-
" feſtoes, ſhew, that Mr. G., when the conduct of
" Miniſters is the object, poſſeſſes the faith "*that*
" *removes mountains.*" It is fit, however, that
" our readers ſhould have ſome ſpecimens of his
" eloquence, his reaſonings, and his modeſty."

P. 55.—' In the ſame perverſe ſpirit and with equal truth you aſcribe the ' emigration of the Royaliſts, and the ſeizure of their eſtates, to the ſame ' cauſe; and boldly aſſert, that, but for the war, the Emigrants " would have " remained within the bolom of France:" whereas it is notorious, that one ' of the ſpecific grounds of complaint alleged by the Briſſotin faction againſt ' the Emperor, was the aſſemblage of large bodies of Emigrants in his domi- ' nions; and that the decree for the confiſcation of their property was paſſed ' by the Legiſlative Aſſembly *before* the declaration of war. The contempt ' which the extreme puerility of your arguments extorts is loſt in ſurpriſe at ' the weakneſs of their baſis. But the foundation being deſtroyed, the ſu- ' perſtructure falls of courſe, exhibiting, in its flimſy ruins, an object for the ' deriſion of ſenſe, the ſcorn of judgment, the deploration of vanity, and the ' lamentations of egotiſm.

' Your general ideas on the cauſes of revolutions in a State, and the baſis ' of civil government, appear to me to be as crude and undigeſted as your par- ' ticular application of them is falſe and unwarranted. Your grand principle, ' as far as I can underſtand it, is—that all lawful " government is a voluntary " emanation from the whole people;" a principle which has been before ad- ' vanced by that arch propagator of wild conceits, that wholeſale fabricator of ' fantaſtical ſyſtems of polity (accuſe me not of political blaſphemy!) *John*

* To thoſe who have read the book it is needleſs for me to obſerve, that there is not one ſyllable of truth in this account of it.

' *Locke*,

' *Locke*, who had ſcarcely given birth to this ſhapeleſs abortion, when he ' cruſhed it at a ſtroke, by proving the *impoſſibility* of its exiſtence. He was ' compelled to acknowledge, that " *the coming into ſociety upon ſuch terms* " would be—only *to go out again.*"

" On the obſervations of Mr. ERSKINE, reſpect-
" ing the never to be forgotten expedition to Qui-
" beron, *you* have the following reflections, in our
" Author's very beſt manner."---P. 65.

' But, ſay you, " What was this proceeding but the very ſyſtem we had " imputed to France, and proclaimed with horror to the univerſe?" The ' jaundiced eye of party could alone deſcry any reſemblance in tranſactions ſo ' different in their nature. The French had holden out an invitation to rebel ' to all the nations of Europe, indiſcriminately, whether at peace or war with ' them, and had, to give effect to the meaſure, by an order of their Legiſlature, ' cauſed ſuch invitations to be tranſlated into all foreign languages. By the ' voluntary offer of her protection to inſurgents, France thus endeavoured to ' produce inſurrections where harmony prevailed, and to diſorganiſe the exiſt- ' ing inſtitutions of Europe, for the purpoſe of eſtabliſhing a general ſyſtem of ' her own. Our Miniſters, on the contrary, in exerciſing the legal rights of ' war againſt a Power which had been guilty of an unprovoked aggreſſion, and ' which had forcibly compelled us to engage in the conteſt, confined their ' operations to affording aſſiſtance to a body of men, who fought in defence ' of a long eſtabliſhed ſyſtem which they had ſolemnly ſworn to maintain, ' againſt a government founded in perjury, violence, and murder; which had ' robbed them of their birth-rights, deſpoiled them of their property, and ' paſſed upon them a ſentence of perpetual baniſhment—a government to which ' they had never ſubmitted, and to which they owed neither fidelity nor alle- ' giance. The reſemblance, therefore, exiſts only in your own imagination; ' the difference is fundamental and radical.'

" Perhaps the following paſſage may be ſup-
" poſed by ſome to be more remarkable for truth
" of ſtatement, as to ſome facts, not altogether
" favourable to the Author's general argument,
" than for the truth of the philoſophy it would
" aſſert; but which the Author, *like his maſter*
" Mr. BURKE, declines the labour of eſtabliſhing."

P. 86 —' You repreſent this mode of waging war againſt principles ' as " a new and fatal principle of hoſtility." The aſſertion is not very cor- ' rect, becauſe Vattel, as we have ſeen, had expreſsly eſtabliſhed the prin- ' ciple; but if the practical application of it be new, whom have we to ' thank for it? Thoſe immaculate Republicans who appear, in your opinion,

' to

‘ to be infallible, but who, in fact, are the firſt people, at leaſt in modern
‘ times, that have rendered the aſſertion of ſuch a principle of hoſtility neceſ-
‘ ſary and unavoidable. Indeed, they were themſelves fully aware, that their
‘ principles muſt be objects of reſiſtance to all exiſting governments; and they
‘ evidently intended that they ſhould be ſo; hence the Preſident of the Con-
‘ vention, after the decree of the 16th had been paſſed in November 1792,
‘ alludiug to the war which France had declared againſt the Emperor and the
‘ King of Pruſſia, obſerved, “ PRINCIPLES ARE WAGING WAR AGAINST
“ TYRANNY, which will fall under the blows of *philoſophy*.” This was
‘ perfectly true; the diſorganizing principles proclaimed by the French Go-
‘ vernment had declared, as they themſelves repeatedly confeſſed, eternal war
‘ againſt *royalty*, that is, againſt every political inſtitution or form of govern-
‘ ment which differed from their own. Of courſe, the regular Governments
‘ were compelled, in their own defence, to wage war againſt thoſe principles.
‘ It was with them not an object of choice but a matter of neceſſity. The
‘ principles were avowedly the active aggreſſors; they were the cauſe of hoſ-
‘ tility. Mr. Fox, indeed, whom you praiſe moſt extravagantly, apparently
‘ for no other reaſon than becauſe his ſentiments correſpond with your own,
‘ was pleaſed to repreſent a conteſt purſued on theſe grounds as having *no*
‘ *defined nor definable* object. But he might as well tell me, that if a man
‘ threatened to take away my life, the judicial means I ſhould adopt for ſe-
‘ curing myſelf againſt the effects of ſuch threats, would have no *definable*
‘ object: and that, before I could have any lawful ground of action, I muſt
‘ wait until he had put his threats in execution. The object, in both caſes,
‘ is to obtain reparation for a paſt act of aggreſſion, and ſecurity againſt any
‘ future act of a ſimilar nature.’

“ We have given to this pamphlet more room
“ than its merit, in our judgment, ſeems to de-
“ mand; but we are willing to give our readers
“ the faireſt ſpecimens of *miniſterial* eloquence. It
“ has been remarked, that the diſciples of the
“ ſchool of WARBURTON never failed to diſplay
“ his inſolence, but ſeldom diſcovered any kindred
“ ability. Mr. BURKE, if not ‘ the founder of a
“ family,’ is the founder of a ſchool, and the ſcho-
“ lars of BURKE appear to reſemble the diſciples
“ of WARBURTON.

“ Mr. ERSKINE’s pamphlet was written with
“ *moderation* and *urbanity*, without acrimony, and

“ without

" without invective. Yet Mr. G. has attacked " him with all the virulence, but without the " force, of Mr. BURKE. Mr. BURKE is a comet, " which ſo dazzles us by its brilliancy, that in " contemplating its ſplendor, we forget that it is " ſhaking from its hair peſtilence and war. Mr. G. " is a common fire, noticed only for the fierceneſs " of its rage, and its *indiſcriminate deſtruction.*"

This Critic takes occaſion to extend his remarks in a ſubſequent Number, in which my language is repreſented as *arrogant*, and my motives as *mean*; in which I am ſaid to have betrayed, in my *trifling performance*, an *offenſive ſpirit*, and to have expreſſed the feelings I " either poſſeſſed or affected" in *bitter terms*. I was aware that, in attacking the Great Father of Democracy, Mr. LOCKE, I had adminiſtered a pill *too bitter* to be ſwallowed by thoſe Critics, who regarded that philoſopher as their grand idol, and who, in the warmth of their zeal, extended their veneration to his modern diſciples, the Republicans of France. But it is not my intention to purſue the controverſy in this place; the day will come, when the principles of LOCKE will be *analyſed* by a more able pen; and his admirers will then have a fair opportunity of entering the liſts in his defence.

I have now completed my taſk; the Public are in poſſeſſion of the arguments on both ſides of the queſtion, and muſt decide between my opponents and me *en dernier reſort*.

THE END.

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